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I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to give an exposition of material dealing with 
constructive logics. typed i-calculi. and linear logic. During the last fifteen years, 
a significant amount of rcscarch in the areas of programming language theory, 
automated deduction and, more generally, logic and computation has relied heavily 
on concepts and results found in the fields of constructive logics and typed i.-calculi. 
Hobvever. thcrc are very few comprehensive and introductory presentations of con- 
structive logics and typed ;.-calculi for noninitiated researchers, and many people find 
it quite frustrating to become acquainted with this type of research. Our motivation in 
writing this paper is to help till this gap. We have attempted to cover the basic 
material on natural deduction. sequent calculus. and typed i-calculus, but also to 
proCde an introduction to Girard’s linear logic [l2], one of the most exciting 
developments in logic these past six years. As a consequence. we discovered that the 
amount of background material necessary for a good understanding of linear logic 
was quite extensive, and we found it convenient to break this paper into two parts. 
The first part gives an exposition of the background material (with some exceptions. 
such as “contraction-free” systems for intuitionistic propositional logic and the Girard 
translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic, which is new [ 141). The second 
part is devoted to more current topics such as linear logic, proof nets, the geometry of 
interaction, and unified systems of logic (LL’ ). 
In our presentation of the background material, we have tried to motivate the 
introduction of various concepts by showing that they are indispensable to achieve 
certain natural goals. For pedagogical reasons. it seems that it is best to begin with 
proof systems in natural-deduction style (originally due to Gentzen [8] and thor- 
oughly investigated by PrawitL [2h] in the sixties). This way. it is fairly natural to 
introduce the distinction between intuitionistic and classical logic. By adopting 
a description of natural deduction in terms of judgements. as opposed to the tagged 
trees used by Gcntzen and Prawitz, we are also led quite naturally to the encoding of 
proofs as certain typed i-terms, and to the correspondence between proof normaliz- 
ation and p-conversion (the Curr~/Ho\~urd isomorphisn~ [IS]). Sequent calculi can be 
motivated by the desire to obtain more “symmetric” systems, but also systems in 
which proof search is easier to perform (due to the subformula property). At first, the 
cut rule is totally unnecessary and even undesirable. since we are trying to design 
systems as deterministic as possible. We then show how every proof in the sequent 
calculus (9) can be converted into a natural-deduction proof (in I ‘i). In order to 
provide a transformation in the other direction. we introduce the cut rule. But then. 
we observe that there is a mismatch. since we have a transformation I ‘: CC+. Ii on 
cut-free proofs, whereas <q : I i -+ 9:“’ maps to proofs possibly with cuts. The mis- 
match is resolved by Gentzen’s fundamental CM c~linrinrrtion tlieorrm, which in turn 
singles out the crucial role played by the cor~r’ac~io~i nrle. Indeed. the contraction rule 
plays a crucial role in the proof of the cut elimination theorem and, furthermore, it 
cannot be dispensed with in traditional systems for intuitionistic logic (however, in the 
case of intuitionistic propositional logic, it is possible to design contraction-free 
systems; see Section 9 for details). We are. thus, setting the stage for linear logic, in 
which contraction (and weakening) are dealt with in a very subtle way. We then 
investigate a number of sequent calculi that allow us to prove the decidability of 
provability in propositional classical logic and in propositional intuitionistic logic. In 
particular, we discuss some “contraction-free” systems for intuitionistic propositional 
logic for which proof search always terminates. Such systems were discovered in the 
early fifties by Vorob’ev [38, 391. Interest in such systems has been revived recently 
due to some work in automated theorem proving by Dyckhoff [S]. on the embedding 
of intuitionistic logic into linear logic by Lincoln et al. [23], and on the complexity of 
cut elimination by Hudelmaier [ 191. The cut elimination theorem is proved in full for 
the Gentzen system 1/‘.X“ using Tait’s induction measure [32] and some twists due to 
Girard [13]. We conclude with a fairly extensive discussion of the reduction of 
classical logic to intuitionistic logic. Besides the standard translations due to Godel, 
Gentzen, and Kolmogorov. we present an improved translation due to Girard [I41 
(based on the notion of polarity of a formula). 
In writing this paper, we tried to uncover some of the intuitions that may either 
have been lost or obscured in advanced papers on the subject, but we have also tried 
to present relatively sophisticated material. because this is more exciting for the 
reader. Thus, we have assumed that the reader has a certain familiarity with logic and 
lambda calculus. If the reader does not feel sufficiently comfortable with these topics, 
we suggest consulting [9, 63 for a background on logic, and [2, 17, 223 for a back- 
ground on lambda calculus. For an in-depth study of constructivism in mathematics, 
we highly recommend [35]. 
2. Natural deduction, simply typed l-calculus 
We first consider a syntactic variant of the natural-deduction system for implica- 
tional propositions due to Gentzen [8] and Prawitz [26]. 
In the natural deduction system of Gentrcn and Prawitz. a deduction consists in 
deriving a proposition from a finite number of packets of assumptions. using some 
predefined inference rules. Technically. packets are multisets of propositions. During 
the course of a deduction, certain packets of assumptions can be “closed”, or “dis- 
charged”. A proof is a deduction such that all the assumptions have been discharged. 
In order to formalize the concept of a deduction. one faces the problem of describing 
rigorously the process of discharging packets of assumptions. The difficulty is that one 
is allowed to discharge any number of occurrencIzs of the same proposition in a single 
step, and this requires some form of tagging mechanism. At least two forms of tagging 
techniques have been used: 
The first one. used by Gentzen and Prawitz. consists in viewing a deduction as 
a tree whose nodes are labeled with propositions (for a lucid presentation. see [37]). 
One is allowed to tag any set of occurrences of some proposition with a natural 
number. which also tags the infercncc that triggers the simultaneous discharge of all 
the occurrences tagged by that number. 
The second solution consists in keeping 21 record of all undischarged assumptions at 
every stage of the deduction. Thus, a deduction is a tree whose nodes are labeled 
with expressions of the form I‘ t_ 4. called sey~srlfs. where .4 is a proposition, and 
r is a record of all undischarged assumptions at the stage of the deduction 
associated with this node. 
Although the first solution is perhaps more natural from a human’s point of view 
and more economical, the second one is mathematically easier to handle. In the 
sequel. we adopt the second solution. It is convenient to tag packets of assumptions 
with labels, in order to discharge the propositions in these packets in a single step. We 
use variables for the labels. and ;I packet labeled with s consisting of occurrences of 
the proposition ,+l is written as s:.*I. TIILIS. in a sequent I‘ t /I. the expression I‘ is any 
finite set of the form X, : A, . . .x,,,:,d ,,,. where the .s, arc pairwise distinct (but the A, 
need not be distinct), Given I‘= .Y, : .4 , , , s,,, : A ,,, . the notation I’. I: A is well-defined 
only when .Y # s, for all i. I < i ,< HI. in which cast it denotes the set 
\-,:A , . . I,,{ : .A )), , Y:.-l. We ha\c the following axioms and inference rules. 
Definition 2.1. The ;lxioms and inference rules of the system I ‘,, (implication logic) are 
I‘, .X:/l t ‘-1 
In an application of the rule ( z-intro), we say that the proposition A which appears 
as a hypothesis of the deduction is tli.sc~l~tr/~& (or c~/oscY~).’ It is important to note that 
the ability to label packets consisting of occurrences of the same proposition with 
different labels is essential. in order to be able to have control over which groups of 
packets of assumptions are discharged simultaneously. Equivalently, we could avoid 
tagging packets of assumptions with variables if we assumed that in a sequent F t C, 
the expression r, also called a c~rrcst, is a ~~ulti.set of propositions. The following two 
examples illustrate this point. 
Example 2.2. Let 
l‘=s:il I(f?I C).r:A 3 B,::A 
Then 
.Y:A~(BI>C),~:AIB EAxC 
s:Ax(B=,C) ~(AxB)x(AIC) 
In the above example, two occurrences of A are discharged simultaneously. Com- 
pare with the example below. where these occurrences are discharged in two separate 
steps. 
Example 2.3. Let 
P ä AI(B=IC) I‘tA I‘ C_AIB rEA _ 
r tB1C rtB 
s:A I(BX C),_v:A 2 B.z,:A,z, :A tC 
.Y:A~~>(BIC),\XAIB,Z,:A EAxC 
s:A x(B=) C),:,: A I-(A~B)I(AIC) 
:,:A ~(AI(B~C))~((A~B)I(AIC)) 
EA~((A~(B~C))~((A=JB))~(A~C))) 
For the sake of comparison, we show what these two natural deductions look like in 
the system of Gentzen and Prawitz. where packets of assumptions discharged in the 
same inference are tagged with a natural number. Example 2.2 corresponds to the 
following tree. 
Example 2.4. 
(Az(B3C))J A’ (A3B)2 A’ 
BIG B 
c 1 
A3C 2 
(AIB)I(AIC) 
3 
(AI(B~C))~((A~B)~(A~C)) 
Example 2.3 corresponds to the following tree. 
Example 2.5. 
(Az(BxC))” A’ (‘4 1 B)’ A” _ 
BxC B 
c I 
AxC 2 
(A3~)3(~=C) 3 
(A=,(B=C))~((A~B)~(A~C)) j 
AI((Ax(B=,C))~((A~B)~(A~C))) 
It is clear that a context (the 1’ in a sequent r t A) is used to tag packets of 
assumptions and to record the time at which they are discharged. From now on, we 
stick to the presentation of natural deduction using sequents. 
Proofs may contain redundancies. for example. when an elimination immediately 
follows an introduction, as in the following example in which 1/i denotes a deduction 
with conclusion T..u: A t B and Vz denotes a deduction with conclusion r t A: 
Intuitively, it should be possible to construct a deduction for r t B from the two 
deductions 9, and Vz without using at all the hypothesis X: A. This is indeed the case. 
If we look closely at the deduction (/i. from the shape of the inference rules, 
assumptions are never created, and the leaves must be labeled with expressions of the 
form r’,d,s:A,_t~:C LC or T,d,s:A EA, where _r#_x and either T=T’ or 
I‘= r’, y: C. We can form a new deduction for r )- B as follows: in (/i , wherever a leaf 
of the form r, 4, x: A k A occurs, replace it by the deduction obtained from Ir2 by 
adding d to the premise of each sequent in 9,. Actually, one should be careful to first 
make a fresh copy of Vz by renaming all the variables so that clashes with variables in 
‘Vi are avoided. Finally, delete the assumption Y: A from the premise of every sequent 
in the resulting proof. The resulting deduction is obtained by a kind of substitution 
and may be denoted as (VI [ VZ(u], with some minor abuse of notation. Note that the 
assumptions x:,4 occurring in the leaves of the form I“, d,.u: A,y:C t_C were never 
used anyway. This illustrates the fact that not all assumptions are necessarily used. 
This will not be the case in linear logic [ 121. Also, the same assumption may be used 
more than once, as we can see in the ( I-elim) rule. Again. this will not be the case in 
linear logic, where every assumption is used exactly once, unless specified otherwise by 
an explicit mechanism. The step which consists in transforming the above redundant 
proof figure into the deduction ‘/r [ Vz:!.x] is called a rduction step or normulization 
step. 
We now show that the simply typed i-calculus provides a natural notation for 
proofs in natural deduction, and that P-conversion corresponds naturally to proof 
normalization. The trick is to annotate inference rules with terms corresponding to 
the deductions being built, by placing these terms on the right-hand side of the 
sequent, so that the conclusion of a sequent appears to be the “type of its proof”. This 
way. inference rules have a reading as “type-checking rules”. This discovery due to 
Curry and Howard is known as the Curr~lHoward isomorphism, or ,fkmnulur- 
us-types principk [1X]. An early occurrence of this correspondence can be found in [3, 
Chapter 9E, pp. 312P315]. Furthermore, and this is the deepest aspect of the 
Curry/Howard isomorphism, proof normalization corresponds to term reduction in 
the i-calculus associated with the proof system. 
Definition 2.6. The type-checking rules of the i.-calculus j_ 3 (simply typed jL-calculus) 
are listed below: 
f,.x:A )-s:A 
T,r: A tM:B 
I- t(k:A.M):A XJ B 
(abstraction) 
f kM:AzB f kN:A 
I‘ t(MN):B 
(application) 
Now, sequents are of the form f k M: A, where M is a simply typed jb-term 
representing a deduction of A from the assumptions in r. Such sequents are also 
called jud~genwnt.s, and I’ is called a t2pe assiynnwnt or contest. 
The example of redundancy is now written as follows: 
l-x:A tM:B 
f F(b:A.M):A 3 B r )_N:A 
r t(iu:A.M)N:B 
Now, 9, is incorporated in the deduction as the term M, and qi2 is incorporated in 
the deduction as the term N. The great bonus of this representation is that Y, [GZ*/x] 
corresponds to M [ N/s], the result of performing a P-reduction step on (i-x: A. M)N. 
‘56 -. J. (,~rllwi 
Example 2.7. 
The term (i.s:( P 3 (Q 2 P)).ilr:P.~l);.?‘:t).~.-_:Q.!. reduces to j.u:P.u, which is 
indeed the term representation of the natural-deduction proof 
Thus. the simply typed i.-calculus arises as a natural way to encode natural- 
deduction proofs. and /i-reduction corresponds to proof normalization. The corres- 
pondence between proof normalization and term reduction is the deepest and most 
fruitful aspect of the Curry. Howard isomorphism. Indeed, using this correspondence, 
results about the simply typed i-calculus can be translated into the framework of 
natural-deduction proofs, a very nice property. On the other hand, one should not be 
too dogmatic(or naive) about the Curry’ Howard isomorphism and make it into some 
kind of supreme commandment (as we say in French. “prendre ses d&sirs pour des 
r&lit&“). In the functional style of programming. i-reduction corresponds to para- 
meter passing. but more is going on, in particular recursion. Thus, although it is 
fruitful to view ;I program as a proof. the specification of a program as the proposition 
proved by that proof. and the execution of ;L program as proof normalization (or cut 
elimination. but it is confusing to say that. since in most cases \ve are dealing with 
;I natural-dedLlction system). it is abusi\,e to claim that this is ivhot programming is all 
about. In fact. I believe that statements to that ell‘ect are detrimental to our ficld. There 
are plenty of smart people who are doing research in the theory of programming and 
programming language design, and such statements will only make them skeptical (at 
best). Programming cannot be reduced to the Curry Howard isomorphism. 
When wc deal with the calculus i ?. rather than using 2. WC usually LIX +; thus. 
the calculus is denoted as i +. In order to avoid ambiguities. the delimiter used to 
separate the left-hand side from the right-hand side of a judgement I- t M:A will bc 
i ‘. so that judgcments are written as I‘! M:.4. 
Before moving on to more fascinating topics. we cannot resist ;I brief digression on 
notation (at least. we will spare the reader the moralistic lecture that we have inflicted 
upon students over more than fourteen years!). Notation is supposed to help us. but 
the trouble is that it can also be a handicap. This is because there is a very delicate 
balance between the explicit and the implicit. Our philosophy is that the number of 
symbols used should be minimized, and that notation should 1w//1 remembering N;hat 
things are. rather than fiwcx) remembering Lvhat things are. The most important thing 
is that notation should bc as unambiguous as possible. Furthermore. we should allow 
ourselves dropping certain symbols as long as no serious ambiguities arise. and we 
should avoid using symbols that already have a standard meaning. although this is 
nearly impossible. 
Lambda abstraction and substitution are particularly spicy illustrations. For 
example, the notation is:rrM together with (M/V) for application is unambiguous. 
However. when we see the term (is:riMN). we have to think a little (in fact, too much) 
to realize that this is indeed the application of is:rrM to N, and not the abstraction 
ir:o( MN). This is even worse if we look at the term Ls:rrMN. where the parentheses 
have been dropped. So, we may consider introducing extra markers. just to help 
readability, although they are not strictly necessary. For example, we can add a dot 
between IT and M: abstraction is then written as is:a.M. Similarly, universally 
quantified formulae arc written as V’\-:o.A. Now, is:o.MN is a little better, but still 
requires an effort. Thus, we will add parentheses around bhe lambda abstraction and 
write (/,s:rr.M)N. Yes, we are using more symbols than we really need. but we feel 
that we have removed the potential confusion with ir:o.MN (which should really be 
written as ;..~:a.( MN)). Since we prefer avoiding subscripts or superscripts unless they 
are really necessary. we favor the notation L.\-:a.M over (the slightly old-fashioned) 
Ls”.M (we do not find the economy of one symbol worth a superscript).’ Now. let us 
present another choice of notation. a choice that we consider poor since it forces us to 
remember something rather than help us. In this choice. abstraction is written as 
[.~:a] M, and universal quantification as (.Y:a),+l. The problem is that the reader needs 
to remember which kind of bracket corresponds to abstraction or to (universal) 
quantification. Since additional parentheses are usually added when applications 
arise, we find this choice quite confusing. The argument that this notation corresponds 
to some form of machine language is the worst that can be given. Humans are not 
machines and, thus, should not be forced to read machine code! An interesting 
variation on the notation X.~:ri.!\l and V.Y:rr.A is i(z:~),21 and V(.u:o)A, which is 
quite defendable. Substitution is an even more controversial subject! Our view is the 
following. After all, a substitution is a function whose domain is a set of variables and 
which is the identity except on u finite set. Furthermore, substitutions can be com- 
posed. But ~~MYIW! Composition of substitutions is rot function composition (indeed, 
a substitution q induces a homomorphism ~5. and the composition of two substitu- 
tions ye and $ is the function composition of (,?I and $, and rot of CQ and $). Thus. the 
choice of notation for composition of substitutions has an influence on the notation 
for substitution. If WC choose to denote composition of substitution in the order q:Ic/, 
then it is more convenient to denote the result of applying a substitution y, to a term 
M as M(p, or (M)cp, or as we prefer as :21[ (~1. Indeed, this way, ;21 [q] [ $1 is equal to 
:21[~;$]. Now. since a substitution is a function with domain a finite set of variables, 
it can be denoted as [zl H :tl , , . . . . . Y,,H n/r,,]. In retrospect. we regret not having 
adopted this notation. If this was the case. applying a substitution to M would be 
denoted as M [.vI E+ .V, 1 . .x,, H M,,]. Instead, we use the notation [t, II s, , , t,, LX,,]. 
which has been used for some time in automated theorem proving. Then, applying 
a substitution to M is denoted as M[r,.\-, . ___, t,,:.~,,] (think for just a second of the 
2.58 ./. Grr//rc/ 
horrible clash if this notation was used with [.Y:o] M for abstraction!). Other authors 
denote substitutions as [.Y~ := M, . . s,,:= M,,]. Personally, we would prefer switch- 
ing to [.x, HM 1 ~ .. . . .Y,,H A%1,,], because := is also used for denoting a function 
,fwhose value at some argument x is redefined to be (I, as in,f’[.y := LI]. Finally, a word 
about sequents and judgcments. To us, the turnstile symbol t means provability. 
A sequent consists of two parts r and 4. and some separator is needed between them. 
In principle, anything can do. and if the arrow 4 was not already used as a type 
constructor, we would adopt the notation r +L4. Some authors denote sequents as 
I‘ l-,1. A problem then arises when we want to say that a sequent is provable, since this 
is written as Er En. The ideal is to USC symbols of different size for the two uses of I-. 
In fact, we noticed that Girard himself has designed his own t which has a thicker but 
smaller (in height) foot: F. Thus. we will use the “Girardian turnstile” k in writing 
sequents as f t_ A. Judgements have three parts, r. M, and (T. Our view is that f and 
M actually come together to form what WC have called elsewhere a “declared term” 
(thinking of the context I‘ as ;I declaration of the variables). Again we need a way to 
put together I‘ and M, and we use the symbol i> . thus forming r 0 M. Then. 
a declared term may have a type U. and such a judgement is written as I‘ Ll M:a. To 
say that a judgement is provable, we write E-I‘ :‘> M:a. We find this less confusing 
than the notation EI‘ EM : CT. and this is why we favor r 5 M:rr over r kM:o (but 
some authors use .> for the reduction relation! We use 4). And please, avoid the 
notation t-1‘ EME~, which we find terribly confusing and cruel to E. But we have 
indulged too long into this digression. and now back to more serious business. 
3. Adding conjunction, negation, and disjunction 
First, we present the natural-deduction systems, and then the corresponding exten- 
sions of the simply typed /.-calculus. As far as proof normalization is concerned, 
conjunction does not cause any problem. but. as we will see, negation and disjunction 
are more problematic. In order to add negation, we add the new constant I (false) to 
the language, and define negation 1 A as an abbreviation for A 3 1. 
Definition 3.1. The axioms and inference rules of the system 1 ‘,‘. ‘, “.’ (intuitionistic 
propositional logic) are 
I-,\-:A FA 
f-FL 
K= (L-eiim) 
: -L: c: ( 1 -intro) 
I‘tA1B l-CA 
rLB 
( 3 -elim) 
f- EAr\B 
rEA 
rFA 
r I_AvB 
l- EAvB 
A -elim) 
1‘ FAAB 
r EB (A-elim) 
v-intro) r:5fB (v-intro) 
r..Y:A EC r,y:B t c 
rkc 
( v -elim) 
259 
Since the rule (I-elim) is trivial (does nothing) when A = I, from now on, we will 
assume that A # 1. Minimu/ propositior~~rl loyic , I ‘“; 3 A “,’ is obtained by dropping 
the (I-elim) rule. In order to obtain the system of cIL/.ssiA propositional logic, denoted 
('3.A.V.l. we add to , ',;.r.V.i 
111 the following inference rule corresponding to the 
principle of proof by contradiction (/IJWMW~) (also called reductio ud uhsurdum). 
r..Y:lA F-I 
rtA 
(by-contra) 
Several useful remarks should be made: 
(I) In classical propositional logic (. I ‘,?, A. “. ‘), the rule 
can be derived, since if we have a deduction of I‘ t 1. then for any arbitrary A we 
have a deduction r, x:1 A t 1 and, thus, a deduction of r E A by applying the 
(by-contra) rule. 
(2) The proposition A 3 11 A is derivable in I ‘,‘. A. “.l, but the reverse implica- 
tion 11 A 2 A is not derivable, not even in I “,A. “.l. On the other hand, 
11 A 3 A is derivable in I ‘,“. A. “.l: 
.y:ll A. 1%:~ : A FTT A .u:llA,y:~A klA 
.x:11 A,y:lA E 1 (by_contra) 
s:llA tA 
(3) Using the (by-contra) inference rule together with (I-elim) and ( v-intro), we 
can prove 1 A v A (that is, (A 3 I) v A). Let 
l-=u:((Axl)vA)xI. 
We liavc the following proof for (A 3 1) v A in 1 ‘,‘. “, ‘. ’ : 
I‘. 1’: A t/l 
I-,),:/f I_((AI3l.)vA)3l I-, ),:.4 t_( A 1 I) v A 
I‘. ,~:,+I t 1 
I‘ t.4 31 
I‘~((A3l)vA)I>1 r k(A 3 i)vil 
I-t1 
~~ (by-contra) 
k(43i)vA 
As in (2). 1 il v .-I is not derivable in I ,-I. ‘. ’ The reader might wonder how one 
shows that 11 .4 2 .4 and 1.4 v .1 are not provable in I ‘i7. “. ‘. ‘. In fact, this is not 
easy to prove directly. One method is to LISC the fact (given by Theorems 3.4 and 3.5) 
that every proof term reduces to :I unique normal form. Then, argue that if the above 
propositions have ;t proof in normal form. this leads to a contradiction. Another even 
simpler method is to use cut-free Gentzcn systems, to be discussed in Sections 4, 8. 
and 9. 
The typed i.-calculus i’- *. ’ corresponding to. I ‘;‘. A’ “. ’ is given in the following 
definition. 
Definition 3.2. The typed i-calcul~~s i ‘. ‘. t. ’ is defined by the following rules: 
I’. .x:.4 .\‘: 1 
with A # 1. 
I‘. .Y : 4 ’ Af: B 
I‘ 
~~ (abstraction) 
_~ ii.\-: .A I1 ):.3 + B 
IVIA ~ (application) 
1. ~’ :21:.-l x B 
~~~~~ (projection) 
I‘ ,M: il x B 
I‘, ’ n , ( :I,1 ) : A ,- , n2( ,$J).B (proJectlon) 
I‘[ :2J:A 
~-- ~~~ (injection) 
I‘ :w : B 
~- .--~~ 
f‘f inl(,%Z):.rl+B I“ ~ inr(M):A+B 
(injection) 
I‘ P.4 + B I‘..\-: 4 I :Il:C I-, I‘: B !V:C 
I‘ 
~~~~ (by-WCs) 
case(P.i.\-:A.,2~.;.~,:B.!Y):(‘ 
A syntactic variant of case( P, i\-: A.M. iy:i?. N) often found in the literature is 
casel’of inl(r:A) * Mlinr(_ts:B)=>N, 
or even 
caseP of inl(\-) * @linr(j,)*N, 
and the (by-cases) rule can be written as 
I‘ I’, P:A +B T,.Y:A .-> M:C l‘,y:B P N:C 
I‘l,(caseP of inl(.u:A) - Mlinr(J,:B)*N):C 
(by-cases) 
We also have the following reduction rules. 
Definition 3.3. The reduction rules of the system i+.x.t.L are 
(2.~:A.M)N 4 .V[~V,..\-1, 
Tl,((.W,h’)) + XI. 
7rJ((!!f,N)) + !Y, 
case(inl(P).is:A.iZI,i~:B.N) --$ M[P:.u], or 
caseint(P) of inl(r:A) * hllinr(_t$:B)*N + M[P:.x], 
case( inr( P). i.\-: A. M. in,: B. N) + N[ P,‘J~]. or 
caseinr(P)of inl(.\-:A) + 5fIinr(~*:B)*N + N[P:J~]. 
-.,_Jj(M)N + -H(M). 
Ir,( ‘~‘.,X,I(!~f)) --f -.,(M), 
n,( 7, rH( n-l)) + YH( M), 
case( r.., + I3 (P).i\-:A.M.ir:B.N) + ‘-JP). 
Alternatively, as suggested by Asclinder Sukez, we could replace the rules for case 
by the rules 
case( in1 (P). M, N) + ,‘LilP. 
case( inr( P). M. W) + NP, 
case( -., +H( P). M. N) 4 T(.( P). 
A fundamental result about natural deduction is the fact that every proof (term) 
reduces to B normal form. which is unique up to ~-renaming. This result was first 
proved by Prawitz 1271 for the system 1’,‘, A. v. ’ 
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Theorem 3.4 (Church 
(specqified in Dqfillitiorl 
Chch Ros,srr. 
A proof can be given by adapting the method of Tait and Martin-Liif [24] using 
a form of parallel reduction (see also 12, 17. 301). 
Theorem 3.5 (Strong normalization property, Prawitz 1271). Reduc~tion i 2’. ‘.+. ’ ( IIS 
in Lkqifinition 3.3) is stror1gly tzomclli-_irl(~. 
A proof can bc given by adapting Tait’s reducibility method [3 I. 331, as done in [ 10, 
1 l] (see also [7]). 
If one looks at the rules of the systems 1 ‘I. *. “1 ’ (or i’.“~+.’ ). one notices 
a number of unpleasant features: 
(I) There is an trs~wmrtr~~ between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of 
a sequent (or judgement): the right-hand side must consist of a single formula. but the 
left-hand side may have any finite number of assumptions. This is typical of intuition- 
istic logic (and it is one of the major characteristics of its sequent-calculus formula- 
tions; see Section 4) but it is also a defect. 
(2) Negation is very badly handled, only in an indirect fashion. 
(3) The ( 3 -intro) rule and the ( v -elim) rule are global rules requiring the discharge 
of assumptions. 
(4) Worst of all, the ( v -elim) rule contains the parasitic formula C which has 
nothing to do with the disjunction being eliminated. 
Finally, note that it is quite difficult to search for proofs in such a system. Gentzen’s 
sequent systems remedy some of thcsc problems. 
4. Gentzen’s sequent calculi 
The main idea is that now a sequent r Cd consists of two finite multisets r and 
A of formulae, and that rather than having introduction and elimination rules. we 
have rules introducing a connective on the left or on the right of a sequent. A first 
version of such a system for classical propositional logic is given next. In these rules 
r and n stand for possibly empty finite multisets of propositions. 
Definition 4.1. The axioms and inference rules of the system 3,:. A. “. ’ for classical 
propositional logic are 
A, A,l- E/l 
A r ä A (contrac: left) 
r t/l,A,A 
I‘kA,A 
(contrac: right) 
A.r +A B,l- td 
AvB,I- Ed 
I- FA,A B,r EA 
AIB,l- tA 
r tA,A r )_A,B 
1- kA,Ar\B 
(A: right) 
( v : left) ,‘:,“;“;“, (v: right) 
( 3 : left) :LFfcB ( 2: right) 
A,r Ed 
r kA,lA 
(1: right) 
Note the perfect symmetry of the left and right rules. If one wants to deal with the 
extended language containing also I, one needs to add 
l,r EA. 
the axiom 
One might be puzzled and even concerned about the presence of the contraction 
rule. Indeed, one might wonder whether the presence of this rule will not cause 
provability to be undecidable. This would certainly be quite bad, since we are dealing 
only with propositions! Fortunately, it can be shown that the contraction rule is 
redundant for classical propositional logic (see Section 8). But then, why include it in 
the first place? The main reason is that it cannot be dispensed with in traditional 
systems for intuitionistic logic, or in the case of quantified formulae (however, in the 
case of propositional intuitionistic logic, it is possible to formulate contraction-free 
systems which easily yield the decidability of provability; see Section 9). Since we 
would like to view intuitionistic logic as a subsystem of classical logic, we cannot 
eliminate the contraction rule from the presentation of classical systems. Another 
important reason is that the contraction rule plays an important role in cut elimina- 
tion. Although it is possible to hide it by dealing with sequents viewed as pairs of sets 
rather than multisets, we prefer to deal with it explicitly. Finally, the contraction rule 
plays a crucial role in linear logic, and in the understanding of the correspondence 
between proofs and computations, in particular strict versus lazy evaluation (see Cl]). 
In order to obtain a system for intuitionistic logic, we restrict the right-hand side of 
a sequent to consist of 17t mosf one ,fiwnnu/a. We also modify the (I: left) rule and the 
( v : right) rule which splits into two rules. The (contrac: right) rule disappears, and it is 
also necessary to add a rule of weakening on the right, to mimic the (I-elim) rule. 
Definition 4.2. The axioms and inference rules of the system ??T. A. “.l for intuitionis- 
tic propositional logic are 
A,r tA 
rt 
~ (weakening: right) 
r LA 
A.A,I‘ C_d 
A.r t/3 
(contrac: left) 
A, B, I‘ F A ( A : left) 
Ar\B,f td 
(A : right) 
A.l- t/t B,l‘ EA 
AvB,l- F-n 
( v : left) 
Gis (v: right) ,_L:f B (v: right) 
ft.4 B.I‘ )_ 1 
--~ ( 3: left) 
A,I‘)_B 
AIB,~ t,l 
rGrB ( 2: right) 
rtA 
~~ (7: left) 
1A.T F 
rG’r, (1: right) 
c 
In the above rules, 3 contains at most one formula. If one wants to deal with the 
extended language containing also I, one simply needs to add the axiom 
1.r k-n. 
where again. d contains at most one formula. If we choose the language restricted to 
formulae over A, 3, v. and 1. then negation 1 A is viewed as an abbreviation for 
A 2 1. Such a system can be 
I, r t A implies that the rule 
rF-I 
I‘tA 
simplified a little bit if we observe that the axiom 
with A # I is derivable. Indeed. assume that we have the axiom I, I’ t A. If r t I is 
provable, an inspection of the inference rules shows that the proof must contain some 
leaf nodes of the form r’ )_ 1. Since these leaves are axioms, we must have 1~1“, in 
which case r’ t A is also an axiom. A simple induction shows that we obtain a proof 
of F t A by replacing all occurrences of i on the right-hand side of t by A. We can 
also prove that the converse almost holds. Since I, r k I is an axiom, using the rule 
we see that 1, 1' t A is provable. The reason why this is not exactly the converse is 
that 1. I‘ I_ is not provable in this system. This suggests that one should consider 
sequents of the form I‘ t A. where A consists C.YLIC.I/J’ O/‘LI .sir~(g/r ~/im?~uh. In this case, 
the axiom 1. I‘ k A is equivalent to the rule 
rtl 
~~ (I: right) 
rtA 
(with A # I). We have the following system. 
Definition 4.3. The axioms and inference rules of the system %I’. A. “,’ for intuitionis- 
tic propositional logic are 
A,r tA 
:_ (I: right) 
with A # I, 
A,A,I- EC 
A r t-c (contrac: left) 
A,r tC 
B’ r Ec ( v : left) 
AvB,l- )_C 
,_ztB (v: right) ,_zfB (v: right) 
rl-A B.r EC 
AIB,r EC 
( 3: left) :::I: ( 3: right) 
There is a close relationship between the natural deduction system I ‘:. A. “. ’ and 
the Gentzen system ‘9’. A. ’ .‘. In fact, there is a procedure .i for translating every 
proof in <$‘, A. “. ’ into a deduction in _ 1”. A. “,‘. The procedure I 1’ has the 
remarkable property that I ‘( f7) is a deduction in normal form for every proof f7. 
Since there are deductions in I “~ “. “. ’ that are not in normal form, the function 
1 is riot surjective. The situation can be repaired by adding a new rule to ??T, A, “.‘, 
the gut rule. Then there is a procedure I mapping every proof in 9:. *. “,’ to 
a deduction in I “.A. “.‘, and a procedure M mapping every deduction in 
1 ‘,I. A. v.L to a proof in <q’. A. v.L.cUt. 
In order to close the loop, we would need to show that every proof in 
Yil, A. “.i.CU’ can be transformed into a proof in gil. A. “.‘, that is, a cut-free proof. It 
is an extremely interesting and deep fact that the system Cgil. A, “.‘.w~ and the system 
Yil. A. “.’ are indeed equivalent. This fundamental result, known as the cut elimination 
tlworevn, was first proved by Gentzen in 1935 [S]. The proof actually gives an 
algorithm for converting a proof with cuts into a cut-free proof. The main difficulty is 
to prove that this algorithm terminates. Gentzen used a fairly complex induction 
measure which was later simplified by Tait [32]. 
The contraction rule plays a crucial role in the proof of this theorem, and it is, 
therefore. natural to believe that this rule cannot be dispensed with. This is indeed true 
for the intuitionistic system !q;. A. “.’ (but it can be dispensed with in the classical 
system !!7,‘.^~ “. ‘). If we delete the contraction rule from the system Uil, A. “.’ (or 
QJi”. A. v.1 ), certain formulae are no longer provable. For example, t-11 (P v 1 P) 
is provable in !g 3, A. “.-‘, but it is impossible to build a cut-free proof for it without 
using (contrac: left). Indeed, the only way to build a cut-free proof for 
~11 (P vlP) without using (contrac: left) is to proceed as follows: 
l(PVlP)F 
Fl-l(PVlP) 
Since the only rules that could yield a cut-free proof of t P v 1 P are the ( v : right) 
rules and neither t P nor tl P is provable, it is clear that there is no cut-free proof 
of )_PVlP. 
However. t-11 (P v 1 P) is provable in YF. A. “.-I. as shown by the following 
proof (the same example can be worked out in !~i=. *. “,‘). 
Example 4.4. 
PI-P 
PbPVlP 
P,l(PvlP)r 
l(PVlP)klP 
l(PVlP)CPVlP 
3-p v 1 P)ll (P v 1 P) c (contrac: left) 
l(PVlP)F 
ll(PVlP) 
Nevertheless. it is possible to formulate a cut-free system %8X’?, A, “.’ which is 
equivalent to Vi3. A. “.’ (see Section 8). Such a system due to Kleene [20] has no 
contraction rule. and the premise of every sequent can be interpreted as a set as 
opposed to a multiset (furthermore, in the case of intuitionistic propositional logic, it 
is possible to design contraction-free systems which yield easily the decidability of 
provability: see Section 9 for details). 
5. Definition of the transformation , 1 from Yi to 1 ) 
The purpose of this section is to give a procedure I mapping every proof in 
[qi’i.A. v.L to a deduction in 1 ‘,I, A. v.L, The procedure. 1 is defined by induction on 
the structure of proof trees and requires some preliminary definitions. 
Definition 5.1. A proof tree I7 in Y,‘;. A. “. ’ with root node 1‘ F-C is denoted as 
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and similarly a deduction ‘r in I ‘i=, A. “.’ with root node f EC is denoted as 
A proof tree I7 whose last inference is 
is denoted as 
where I7 1 is the immediate subproof of I7 whose root is r I_ B, and a proof tree 
I7 whose last inference is 
A t-D 
is denoted as 
n, n, 
rEB rl-C 
where I7, and Lr7, are the immediate subproofs of n, whose roots are r )_ B and 
f I-C, respectively. 
A similar notation applies to deductions. 
Given a proof tree I7 with root node r EC, 
n 
rtc 
1. yields a deduction . I .(n) of C from the set of assumptions r +, 
where r ’ is obtained from the multiset r. However, one has to exercise some care in 
defining r + so that I is indeed a function. This can be achieved as follows. We can 
assume that we have a fixed total order <P on the set of all propositions so that they 
can be enumerated as P, , P2,. , and a fixed total order <, on the set of all variables so 
that they can be enumerated as .x1,.x2, . 
Definition 5.2. Given a multiset I’= A,, . . . . A,,, since (A 1, . . . . A,,) = (Pi,, . . . . Pi,, ), 
where P,, <,P,, 6,“. <,P;,, (where PI.Pz. . . ..is the enumeration ofall propositions 
and where ij=ij+ 1 is possible since I‘ is a multiset). we define r+ as the set 
7- + =s, :pi,. . . .._ Y,I:P;,,. 
We will also riced the following concepts and notation. 
Definition 5.3. Given a deduction 
the deduction obtained by adding the additional assumptions d to the left-hand side 
of every sequent of 9 is denoted as ,I + 9, and it is well-defined only if 
dom( f ‘)n dom( A )= 0 for every sequent f’ F A occurring in ‘/.” Similarly, given 
a sequential proof 
n 
1‘ t3 
we define the proof /1+ I7 by adding A to the left-hand side of every sequent of 77, and 
we define the proof I7 + 0 by adding 0 to the right-hand side of every sequent of I7. 
We also need a systematic way of renaming the variables in a deduction. 
Definition 5.4. Given a deduction V with root node d FCC, the deduction 9’ 
obtained from ‘9 by r.cc.tj/icr~fior~ is defined inductively as follows: 
Given a context 3 =J’~: Al, . . ..~~..~:,4,,,, define the total order < on d as follows: 
l‘i:Ai<~j:A, iff 
i 
‘4, Gp 3‘4 j* or 
Ai= 14, and yI 6, J‘j. 
The order < on J’, :il,, . . . . ~‘,,,:tl,,, defines the permutation (T such that 
.I’0 (1 ,,A IT(,,<!,~~,Z):A~,~,<‘..<!,(~,,,,-I,:A~(,,,-,,<!,(T,,,,,:A~,,,,). 
If ‘/ consists of the single node !‘,:A1 . . . . . J’,,~:A, I-C’, let A’=.x,:A,~, ,....,. y :A,cm,,. nt 
and deline ‘9’ as d ’ t C. The permutation (T induces a bijection between (s, , . . x,,, ) 
and I.\‘, . . . . . J.,,,). namely .~iH!‘,(i). 
If ‘/ is of the form 
by induction, we have the rectified deduction 
‘2 ’ I 
.\-,:A n(~),...r~j-~:A,~j-~,,.~j:A~,.~j+~:A,~j+~)r..~r.~m:An~,n, tB. 
where sj corresponds to ~1, in the bijection between (x1. . . , x,) and (yr, . . . , y,,,) (in 
fact. j=~-‘(l) since A,=A n, j,). Then apply the substitution [U,lXj, .xj/.Yj+ 1, 
, .Y,_ 1 !.Y,,,] to the deduction ‘s’~, and form the deduction 
s,:A rr(l),...r-‘ij-l:A,cj~I,,s,,,:Al,sj:A,,i+l,,...,.u,-l:A,c,~, kB 
s,:A (T,,),...,~j~1:A,,j~I,,.~j:A,cj+,,,.....~,~1:A,c,, tA, ~B 
A similar construction applies to the rule ( v -elim) and is left as an exercise to the 
reader. The other inference rules do not modify the left-hand side of sequents, and 9’ 
is obtained by rectifying the immediate subtree of 9. 
Note that for any deduction ‘r with root node j’r: A,, , ~1,: A,, t C, the rectified 
deduction c/’ has for its root node the sequent f ’ k C, where r + is obtained from 
the multiset I‘= A,. . . , A, as in Definition 5.2. 
The procedure I is defined by induction on the structure of the proof tree n: 
l An axiom f, A k A is mapped to the deduction (r. A) + k A. 
l A proof /7 of the form 
is mapped to the deduction 
.I ‘(fl,) 
I-+ F-I 
r+ tA 
l A proof I7 of the form 
n, 
A,A,T tB 
is mapped to a deduction as follows. First map n, to the deduction . 1 ‘( l7,) 
‘ ww 
\-:A, y:A, l-* LB 
Next, replace every occurrence of “s: A,J~: A” in 1 ‘( l7,) by “z: A”, where z is a new 
variable not occurring in I ‘( l7, ) and, finally, rectify the resulting tree. 
Before we proceed any further. a sticky point needs to be clarified regarding the 
context s: A, J’: A, f *. In the above transformation. the multiset A, A, r is mapped to 
(A, A. f) + under the operation +. Unfortunately, we cannot assume in general that 
(A, A, r) + =s: A, y: A. r + . because in the enumeration of the propositions forming the 
multiset A, A.f‘, the two occurrences of A may not appear as the last two elements. 
Thus, (‘4, A. I-) ’ is of the form s: A. y: A, f * for some r* not necessarily equal to r + 
This point being cleared up, we will use the notation r* in the rest of the construction 
without any further comments. 
l A proof n of the form 
l-tilr\B 
is mapped to the deduction 
.t’tn,) .I ‘(n2) 
f+ FA I-+ tB 
l A proof I7 of the form 
n, 
A, B,r I-C 
Ar\B,I‘kC 
is mapped to a deduction obtained as follows. First, map I7, to I ‘(h’, ) 
.ww 
x:A.y:B,I‘* k-c 
Next, replace every leaf of the form X: A, y: B, A, f * t A in .1 ‘(n,) by the subtree 
::Ar\B,A,r* EA AB 
z:Ar\B.A,r* LA 
and every leaf of the form X: A, y: B, A, I‘* F B in I ‘( I7, ) by the subtree 
z:Ar\B,A,l-* kAr\B 
z:Ar\B,A,l-* LB 
where 2 is new, replace “s: A, J‘: B” by “L: A A B” in every antecedent of the resulting 
deduction. and rectify this last tree. 
l A proof f7 of the form 
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is mapped to the deduction 
which is then rectified. 
l A proof I7 of the form 
is mapped to a deduction as follows. First map LZ, and I72 to deductions L t‘(n,) 
wb) 
r+ LA 
and 1.( n,) 
. 1 w2) 
u:B,f* EC 
Modify _ 1 ‘(n,) so that it becomes a deduction / 1 ‘(n,) with conclusion r* EA. 
Next, form the deduction 9 
z:A IJ B+. I ‘(n,)’ 
z:A1B,r” C_AIB z:A~,,r* t_A 
z:AIB,l-* FB 
and modify . I ‘( fl,) as follows: replace every leaf of the form x:B, A, r* I-B by the 
deduction which itself is obtained from d + 2 by replacing “x:B” by “z: A 2 B” on 
the left-hand side of every sequent. Finally, rectify this last deduction. 
l A proof I7 of the form 
n, 
rtA 
l- FAvB 
is mapped to the deduction 
‘1 ub) 
r+ tA 
r+ FAvB 
and similarly for the other case of ( v : right) rule. 
l A proof 17 of the form 
iii 
AvB,I‘tC 
is mapped to a deduction as follows. First map n, and i7, to deductions 1 ‘(n, ) 
w,) 
s.A.I‘T EC 
and 1 ‘( n2) 
Since rT and 1-z may differ, construct deductions 
conclusions .x:,4. I‘* EC and )*:B, I‘* t C for the 
deduction 
::AvB+. l’(L’,)’ 
::AvB,r* FAvB z:Av B,s.A,r” EC ._. 
::A v B.r* tC 
and rectify this last tree. 
I ‘(n, )’ and 1 ‘(n,)’ with 
same I‘*. Next, form the 
z:Av B+. I’(h’,)’ 
::AvB,y:B,f-* tC 
This concludes the definition of the procedure I Note that the contraction rule 
can be stated in the system of natural deduction as follows: 
s:A.y:A.l- EB 
::A,!‘ EB 
where z is a new variable. The following remarkable property of I is easily shown. 
Since there are deductions in 1 ‘7. ‘. ‘. ’ that are not in normal form, the function 
I is not surjective. It is interesting to observe that the function 1 is not injective 
either. What happens is that 9,‘. A. “. ’ 1s more sequential than I “. *. ‘.‘, in the 
sense that the order of application of inferences is strictly recorded. Hence, two proofs 
in ‘~,~. h. “. 1 
I of the same sequent may differ for bureaucratic reasons: independent 
inferences are applied in different orders. In I ‘;. A. “.l, these differences disappear. 
The following example illustrates this point. The sequent t( P A P’) I ((Q A Q’) 2 
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(PA Q)) has the following two sequential proofs: 
P,P'.Q,Q' FP P.P',Q,Q' F-Q 
P,P',Q,Q' tPr\Q 
PAP',Q,Q'~PAQ 
Pr\P’,Qr\Q’ tPr\Q 
PAP’ ä (QAQ’)I(PAQ) 
›(~A~‘)~((QAQ’,~(P~\Q)) 
and 
P.P'.Q,Q' )_I' P.P'.Q,Q' EQ 
P,P',Q,Q'tPr\Q 
~,P',QAQ'EPAQ 
PAP’,QAQ’ tPr\Q 
PAP’ ä (QAQ')~(PAQ) 
t(p~p’)~((Q~Q’)~(pr\Q)) 
Both proofs are mapped to the deduction 
.Y:PAP’,y:Qr\Q’tPAP’ s:PAP’,J,:QAQ FQAQ’ 
.Y:PAP’,J,:QAQ’ tP X:PA P’,y:Q A Q’ tQ 
.Y:PAP’,J*:QAQ’ EPAQ 
s:PAP’ ä (QAQ’)=(PAQ) 
F(PAP’)I((QAQ’)~(PAQ)) 
6. Definition of the transformation 9 from I 1 to Yi 
We now show that if we add a new rule, the cut rule, to system Y’.^. “.‘, then we 
can define a procedure 9 mapping every deduction in 1 ,‘~A. ‘. ’ to a proof in 
<qi’.t\, “.l.Cut, 
Definition 6.1. The system YF.“. “. ‘.“H is obtained from the system Cqi3,^. “.’ by 
adding the following rule, known as the cur IX/CC 
r)_A A.l- EC 
TtC 
(cut) 
The system 9‘7. ‘. ‘. ‘.‘“’ is obtained from 1 ‘,j?,^. “.l by adding the following rule, 
also known as the cut rule: 
I- LA.4 A,I‘ t/l _ 
I- k/l 
(cut) 
Next, WC define the procedure Y mapping every deduction in. 1 ‘:.^. “.’ to a proof 
in Yiz.^. “. L.CL”. The procedure 3 is defined by induction on the structure of deduction 
trees. Given a deduction tree ‘r of C from the assumptions r. 
9 yields a proof 3( 9) of the sequent r - EC, 
where r is the multiset A,, ,.,. A,, obtained from the context T=u,: Al, . . . . . x,:,4,, by 
erasing I 1 , . x,, 
l The deduction r, X: A t A is mapped to the axiom I’ -, A I- A. 
l A deduction ‘/ of the form 
is mapped to the proof 
l A deduction ‘/ of the form 
91 92 
TI-A rtB 
r EAr\B 
is mapped to the proof 
Y( 9, ) Y( 92 ) 
r- tA f‘- FB 
r- kAr\B 
l A deduction ‘s of the form 
(J/I 
rFAr\B 
rtA 
is mapped to the proof 
Y( ‘J, ) A,B,r- EA 
1-m kAr\B Ar\B,r- )-A 
r- LA 
(cut) 
and similarly for the symmetric rule. 
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l A deduction c/ of the form 
rkAxB 
is mapped to the proof 
Y( 91) 
A,r- tB 
r-kAxB 
l A deduction Y of the form 
‘J, 92 
rtA=,B rt-A 
rtB 
is mapped to the proof 
‘G( 91) 
Y(9,) r- EA B,r- E-B 
r-FAX> AIB,r- EB 
r_FB 
(cut) 
l A deduction ‘2 of the form 
‘11 
rtA 
l-EAvB 
is mapped to the proof 
!3(‘r,) 
r- EA 
r_tAvB 
and similarly for the symmetric rule. 
l A deduction I/ of the form 
is mapped to the proof 
Y(LYlr,) Y((/J) 
!9( CL/,) A,r- tc B,r- FC 
r_kAvB AvB,r- EC 
r-kc 
(cut) 
This concludes the definition of the procedure Y. 
For the sake of completeness. we also extend the definition of the function I ‘, 
which is presently defined on the set of sequential proofs of the system <qiX.“. “.l, to 
proofs with cuts. that is. to proofs in the system Y3.“. “. ‘.CL”. A proof 17 of the form 
is mapped to the deduction obtained as follows: First. construct 
an d 
1 ‘(n,, 
.X:,4.1‘* tc 
Modify. 1 ‘C/7,) to a deduction I ‘(n,) with conclusion r* t il. Then, replace every 
leaf s: A. .I, f * F .4 in I ‘( I7>) by,)1 +. I ‘(n,)‘, delete “s:A” from the antecedent in 
every sequent. and rectify this last tree. 
7. First-order quantifiers 
We extend the systems I ‘,“,‘. ’ .’ and ST.“. “. ‘.u” to deal with the quantifiers. 
Definition 7.1. The axioms and inference rules of the system I ‘T.^. “.‘,I ’ for intu- 
itionistic first-order logic are listed below: 
l-El 
~ (I-elim) 
1. k,4 
with A # 1. 
I-,s: A k B 
rtA-B (I-intro) 
I-)-A I- C-B 
I‘tAr\B 
~ ( A-intro) 
!I!!!!~+! (*_elim) rtAr\B ~ 
I- t B ( A-e’im) 
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r K t B ( v-intro) rzzB (v-intro) 
r EAVB 1-,s:A EC’ r,J’:B EC 
TEC 
( v-elim) 
I- tA[u”r] l- E’dtA 
I‘ FV’tA 
(V-intro) 
I- FA[t,!t] 
(V-elim) 
where in (V-intro), II does not occur free in r or V’rA; 
I- k A[r/t] 
(j-intro) 
r t3tA z:A[u/t],I- FC 
r E3tA n-c 
(I-elim) 
where in (3-elim), 14 does not occur free in T,3tA, or C. 
The variable u is called the eigrtzw-iahle of the inference. 
One should observe that we are now using two kinds of variables: term (or package) 
variables (s. J’. z, ). and individual (or type) variables (t. II, .). 
The typed 2-calculus 2’,“, ‘.‘.‘.’ corresponding to 1 ‘:.A. “,‘,‘.’ is given in the 
following definition, 
Definition 7.2. The typed 2-calculus i. _. x.+.v.3.L is defined by the following rules: 
r.u:A 3 .u:A 
r3M:l 
r D V,4(M):A 
(I-elim) 
with A # 1, 
T,s:A D M:B 
r> (i~:A.M):A-+B 
(abstraction) 
r > M:A-+B l-D N:A 
I-D (MN):B 
(application) 
TD M:A f-b N:B 
r3> (M,N):AxB 
(pairing) 
r>M:AxB 
r D ~,(M):A (projection) FE ~i~~l~ (pro_iection) 
r D i,ly(z(fA +B (injection) 
I’> P:A+B 1-,.u:A D M:C T,_y:B D N:C 
r D case(P.i..u:A.M,i.y:B.N):C 
(by-cases) 
or 
TD P:A+B l-r:A D M:C r3J rB > N:C (by_cases) 
rD(casePof inl(r:A)*Mlinr(J1:B)+N):C 
1-D M:A[u/t] 
l- D (iu:~. M):V’tA 
(V-intro) 
where u does not occur free in r or V’tA; 
l- D M:VtA 
r 3 MT: A CT/~] 
(V-elim) 
r ~~n~(~$‘~:‘:,A (g-intro) 
l- > M:3tA r,.\-:A[@t] 1> N:C 
TD casex(M,l.u:r.I.s:A[u;lt].N):C 
(5elim) 
where u does not occur free in r, 3tA, or C. 
In the term (i.u:I.M). the type I stands for the type of individuals. Note that 
TD (iu:r.i..~:A[u:t].N):~‘u(A[u.!r]~C) 
The term iu: I. 2.~: A [ ~r,r]. N contains the type A [u/t] which is a depdrnt type, since 
it usually contains occurrences of U. Observe that (iu:r.r..u:il[ul!r].N)r reduces to 
i.x: A [r/t]. N [r/u], in which the type of s is now A [r/t]. The term casex( M, 
i.u:i.i.x:A[u,‘t].N) is also denoted as c&sex M of inx(u:r,r:A[u/r])=> N, or even 
casex M of inx( II, .y) * N, and the (3-elim) rule as 
l- c\ M:3tA l‘,z:A[u/t] D N:C 
TD (casexM of inx(u:I,s:A[u,:r])~N):C 
(3elim) 
where u does not occur free in I-, 3tA, or C. 
Such a formalism can easily be generalized to many sorts (base types) if quantified 
formulae are written as V’t:a.A and 3r:a.A. where g is a sort (base type). A further 
generalization would be to allow higher-order quantification as in Girard’s system F,, 
(see [l 1, 71). We also have the following reduction rules. 
Definition 7.3. The reduction rules of the system j.7. x. +.v.3.1 are 
(ix:A.M)N + M[N;I.u], 
nl((M,N)) 4 M. 
nz((M,N)) + N, 
case( inl( P), M, N) -+ MP, or 
case inl(P) of inl(x:A) =z. Mlinr(y:B)* N + M[P/x], 
case( inr(P), M, N) + NP. or 
case inr(P) of inl(s:A) * Mlinr(J,:B)+ N + N[P/y], 
TA-B(M)N -+ C,(M), 
nz(Snxs(M)) + TdM). 
(h:~.M)r --f M[r,!t]. 
Cv’,,(M)r -+ C,,,,,(M), 
case( CA+d PI, M, N) -+ T’c( PI, 
casex( inx( 5, P), M) -+ (MT) P, or 
casex inx(T,P) of inx(t:r,.y:A)* N + N[~/t,Pjs], 
casex( Cj,4(P), M) --f Cc(P), 
A fundamental result about natural deduction is the fact that every proof (term) 
reduces to a normal form, which is unique up to x-renaming. This result was first 
proved by Prawitz [24] for the system 1 ‘~.h~v.v~3.1. 
Theorem 7.4 (ChurchbRosser property, Prawitz [27]). Reduction in E.*.X~t,v~3.1 
(sprcjfied in Dgjinition 7.3) is cmjiurnt. Equiwlentl)s, conwrsion in /u+.x.+.v.‘,l is 
Churc,h~Rossr~. 
A proof can be given by adapting the method of Tait and Martin-Liif [21] using 
a form of parallel reduction (see also [2, 17, 301). 
Theorem 7.5 (Strong normalization property, Prawitz 119711). Reduction in 
X *. ” + .‘. ‘. ’ is stronyl~* norrfralizirrg. 
A proof can be given by adapting Tait’s reducibility method [31,33], as done in [lo, 
1 l] (see also [7]). 
If one looks carefully at the structure of proofs, one realizes that it is not unreason- 
able to declare other proofs as being redundant and, thus, to add some additional 
reduction rules. For example, the proof term (x1(M), 7r2( M)) can be identified with 
,M itself. Similarly, ifs is not free in *If. the term i::A .( MY) can be identified with $1. 
Thus. we have the following additional set of reduction rules: 
is: il ( ,21.\- ) 4 51 if .s$FV( %I), 
caseMof inl(.v:.-l) * inl(.v)linr(J,:R) * inr(J.) + $1. 
/.t:r.(,2lt) + Al if r $ FV ( :LI ). 
casex M of inx( II: I, z: A [II (1 ) =7 inx( II, .I) + ‘21 if lr$FV( M). 
These rules itrc important in setting up categorical semantics for intuitionistic logic. 
However, a discussion of this topic would take 11s far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Actually, in order to salvage some form of subformula property ruined by the 
introduction of the connectives v ,3. and 1. one can ndd further conversions known 
as “commuting conversions” (or “permutative conversions”). A lucid discussion of the 
necessity for such rules c;~n be found in 1’91. Theorems 7.4 and 7.5 can be extended to 
cover the reduction rules of Dctinition 7.3 together with the new reductions rules. but 
at the cost of rather tedious :tnd rather noninstructivc technical complications. Due to 
lack of space. we will not elaborate any further on this subject and simply refer the 
interested reader to [Zh. I I, 91 for details. 
A sequent-calculus formulation for intuitionistic first-order logic is given in the next 
definition. 
Definition 7.6. The axioms and infcrcnce rules of the system <qir. * .’ .‘.‘. ’ .“” for 
intuitionistic first-order logic ;rrc 
1. F-I 
I.tA (1: right) 
with .4 # 1. 
A.A,I‘tC 
A,I‘ tC 
(contrac: Icft) 
( A : right) 
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A,r tC B,T tc 
AvB,r tC 
( v : left) 
l-EA 
TtAvB 
( v: right) r zc B ( v: right) 
rtA B,r tc 
AIB,r tC 
( 3: left) rAL13BB (I: right) 
A[T;s], r tC 
V’sA,l- F-c 
(V: left) r ,=“~~~x’ (V: right) 
where in (V: right). y does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A[y/s],r tc 
3.xA.T tc 
(3: left) i- t A [r/-\-l (]: right) 
r t3xA 
where in (3: left), J’ does not occur free in the conclusion. 
The variable J‘ is called the ei~~lewtrriahle of the inference. 
A variation of the system <~.3.n~“.v~3.1.cL~’ m which negation appears explicitly is 
obtained by replacing the rule 
rw r (I: right) 
by the rule 
rk 
--~ (weakening: right) 
rFA 
and adding the following negation rules: 
$:: (1: left) A’r t (1: right) 
r tlA 
The resulting system is denoted as !~i3.A~“.v~3.1.0”‘. 
The system ~~.“.V.~.~.i.CUt of classical logic is shown in the next definition. 
Definition 7.7. The axioms and inference rules of the system %c?.A.“.V.3.1.C”t for 
classical first-order logic are given below: 
A,T I-A,A 
A.A,r t3 
A r t A (contrac: left) 
I- EA,A,A 
r ~-d A (contrac: right) 
with A # 1. 
A,l‘t3 l3.r k3 
il v B. r F ,4 
( v : left) :Fs% ( v: right) 
r F_l,A B. I‘ t, 1 I‘ 
.4 1 B.1‘ t3 
( left) .4. F 4. B 3: 
l- ELI,AIB 
(1: right) 
where in (V: right). J’ does not occur free in the conclusion: 
where in (3: left). 1’ dots not occur free in the conclusion. 
A variation of the system ‘gLT,‘“‘.“ p.g. 1 .Cllt m which negation appears explicitly is 
obtained by deleting the rule 
l- E_..I 
I- E n. il 
(I: right) 
and adding the following negation rules: 
l- t A. A 
~ (7: left) 
A. 1‘ k -4 
1A.T t.1 
~-~~~ (1: right) 
r t/l,1 A 
Indeed, it is easy to see that the rule 
I‘ til 
r- kL3. A 
(weakening: right) 
is derivable (using the axioms A. r t.1. il). The resulting system is denoted as 
,q~.n...t/.3. ILCLII 
‘ 
We now extend the functions f and ‘q to deal with the quantifier rules. The 
procedure I is extended 
l A proof I7 of the form 
n, 
A[r xl,1 tC 
V’sA, I. t C 
to cq.7. A. V.S. 1. I .cut as follows. 
2x3 
is mapped to a deduction obtained as follows. First, map HI to 
1 ‘(fl,) 
Next. replace every leaf of the form ),:A [ r/.u], d. r* F A [ s;.Y] in I ‘( I7, ) by the 
subtree 
y:VsA, A, I‘* ttrs A 
_r:V.uA,d.~* FA[r/.u] 
replace every occurrence of “y:A[r/s]” in the resulting tree by “y:V.uA”, and 
rectify this last tree. 
l A proof I7 of the form 
n, 
I- F A[J/.Y] 
l- EV.uA 
is mapped to the deduction 
‘t‘tn,) 
I- + t A[J~!‘s] 
r+ FV’rA 
l A proof n of the form 
4 
A [yir]. I- E C 
3.~A,T FC 
is mapped to the deduction 
u:3rA+. ! jn,) 
U.&A, I-* k3.\-A tr:3\-A,~:A[!.I.~],f* FC 
u:3sA. I-* t C 
and rectify this last tree. 
l A proof I7 of the form 
nr 
f b A[T/.x] 
l- t3sA 
is mapped to the deduction 
.1’(b) 
r+ tA[T/x] 
I-+ )_3sA 
It is easily seen that Lemma 5.5 generalizes to quantifiers. 
Next, WC extend the procedure 9 to I ‘ie.“.‘.‘.3.1. 
l A deduction v of the form 
is mapped to the proof 
l A deduction ‘/ of the form 
r ä A[T,‘.X] 
is mapped to the proof 
l A deduction 9 of the form 
is mapped to the proof 
l A deduction // of the form 
is mapped to the proof 
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We now turn to cut elimination. 
8. Gentzen’s cut elimination theorem 
As we said earlier before presenting the function 9 from I ‘i=../i,v.v.‘.L to 
‘G ,= ^  
I ..‘.I ‘.““‘. it is possible to show that the system Y”. A. b. v. !I. 1 cUt is equivalent to 
the seemingly weaker system Yi~.‘.‘.d.3~1. 
WC have the following fundamental result. 
Proof. The proof is quite involved. It consists in pushing up cuts towards the leaves, 
and in breaking cuts involving compound formulae into cuts on smaller subformulae. 
Full details are given for the system Y’X in Section 12. Interestingly, the need for the 
contraction rule arises when a cut involves an axiom. The typical example is as 
follows. The proof 
nt 
A. F k A A.A,F tC 
A.1‘ tC 
is equivalent to a (contrac: left), and it is eliminated by forming the proof 
n, 
!~!&&?I (contrac: left) 
If we are interested in cut-free proofs, except in c~/rr.s.sic~~/ propositiorwl logic, the 
contraction rules cc~r~r~ot be dispensed with. We already saw in Example 4.4 that 
11 (P vlf’) is a proposition which is not provable without contractions in 
cq.3. h .’ .l. Another example involving quantifiers is the sequent Vs3_),( P_r A 1 P-Y) t, 
which is not provable without contractions in !giX.A.“.D.3. ’ or even in <9i3.A.v.d~3.1. 
This sequent has the following proof in !G’i3.P.‘~d.3.~‘. 
Example 8.2. 
Pu.1 Ps. Pl. t Pll 
Pu. 1 P.U. PC,1 Prr )_ 
P&l P-Y, ( PI, A 1 Pu) k 
(PuAlPs).(Pr~AlPu) t 
( Pu A 1 Px ). 3 \'( Pr A 1 Pll ) t 
It is an interesting exercise to tind a deduction of V.Y~J,( PJ' r\lPs) 3 I in 
,‘=.A.“.V.3.1 
I 
For classical logic. it is possible to show that the contraction rules are needed only 
to permit an unbounded number of applications of the (V: left)-rule and the (3: 
right)-rule (see Lemma 8.7). For example, the formula 3\-V~s(Py 3 Px) is provable in 
!g, 3.A.“,v.3.1, but not without the rule (contrac: right). The cut-free system 
~q‘?.“.“.‘.~.’ can be modified to obtain another system R$’ L:1.A.‘.v,3. ’ in which the 
contraction rules are deleted and the quantifier rules are slightly changed to incorpor- 
ate contraction. 
Definition 8.3. The axioms and inference rules of the cut-free system !cW‘~.~.“.~.~.~ 
for classical first-order logic are 
A,f tA,,4 
A,B,r td r FA,A l‘EA,B 
2~B.r tA 
( A: left) 
l- F,l,Ar\B 
( A: right) 
A,T F.4 B,I‘ E/I 
AvB,I‘ t,l 
( v : left) LLAt;“fB ( v: right) 
r tA,A 
B’ r t n ( 3: left) 
AzBB,r td 
rALAyAAi% (IX right) 
V'sA, A[Ti.x]. 1. t-d I‘ t_ A. A [J/:X] 
V’sA,l- LA 
(V: left) 
r kA,V’?iA 
(V: right) 
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where in (V: right), J’ does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A [ j,;.u], f t A 
-- (3: left) 
f ä d,3rA. A[r,s] 
3sA, f t/l r tA.3sA 
(3: right) 
where in (3: left), y does not occur free in the conclusion. 
The above system is inspired from Kleene [20, system G3, p. 4811. Note that 
contraction steps have been incorporated in the (V: left)-rule and the (3: right)-rule. As 
noted in the discussion before Definition 4.3, if we consider sequents in which the 
right-hand side is nonempty, using axioms of the form 
is equivalent to using the rule 
with A # 1. However. the axioms 1, r k A, A are technically simpler to handle in 
proving the next three lemmas and. thus, we prefer them to the rule (I: right). 
Accordingly, from now on, we will also assume that %‘,?. n.v.Y.‘,l has been formulated 
using the axioms I,P t/l. A rather than the rule (I: right). 
The equivalence of the systems Y,c?.n.“.Y.‘.l and YX‘?,h.“.y.‘.l is shown using two 
lemmas inspired from Kleene [20]. First, it is quite easy to see that every proof in 
c~.~Y’~.“.“~~.‘~ ’ can be converted to a proof in ?7‘?.“.“.V.3.1. 
For the converse, we warn the reader that some of the lemmas given in an earlier 
version were incorrect. The proof of the converse is quite tricky, and I am grateful to 
Peter Baumann for pointing out the earlier errors and helping me in working out the 
new proof. The plan of attack is to show that the weakening and contraction rules are 
derived rules of the system %.JY’~?.^.~. a,3. ’ For the weakening rules, this follows 
immediately by induction. the crucial fact being that the axioms are “fat”, that is, of 
the form A, r Ed, A. For technical reasons (in the proof of Lemma 8.5) we will need 
the fact that in Cq.#‘?.A.v.a.3. ’ every provable sequent has a proof in which every 
axiom has a special form. Such axioms A. r &A, A are such that the formula A itself is 
atomic, all formulae in r are atomic or universal. and all formulae in d are atomic or 
existential. Such axioms will be called rrtorriic’ tr.\-ior~. 
Proof. In constructing a proof, whenever the rule (V: left) of Definition 8.3 is used, let 
us mark the occurrence of V.Y A recopied in the premise, and similarly mark the 
occurrence of 3sA recopied in the premise when (3: right) is used. The lemma is then 
shown by induction on IA,I+..~+IA,,,~+~BII+...+lB,I, the sum of the sizes of the 
utmcrrkrd formulae A 1. , A ,,,, B,, , B,, in a sequent. n 
We now prow ~1 useful permutation lcmim. Given an inference of Y.X’,‘.‘*. j .‘.‘. ‘, 
note that the inference crcatcs ;I new occurrence of ;I formula called the ~~;IIc~;/I~~/ 
formrltr. 
Proof. The proof is b>, induction on the structure of the proof tree. There arc 
2 nunibcr of cases dcpcnding on \vhat (he last inference is. 
Lemma X.5 dws not hold for an occurrence of a formula V’.Y,4 in I or for a formuln 
3\ 3 in 3. hccause the infcrcnce that creates it involves ;I term r. and moving this 
inference down in the proof ma!’ c;~usc’ ;I conllict with the side condition on the 
eigen\ ariable J‘ involved in the rules (V: right) or (3: Icft). As shown by the following 
example. Lemma 8.5 also fails for intuitionistic logic. The sequent P,( P 3 Q). 
(K 2 S) t Q has the follo\ving proof: 
P,(RxS) k-I_’ I’. ( R 3 S ). Q t Q 
P, ( I’ 1 Q ). ( R 3 s 1 t Q 
On the other hand. the following tree is rffjt ;I proof: 
PIP P. Q k-R P.S FP P. S. Q E Q 
P.( P 3 Q__t- R I’. ( P ~3 Q ). S t Q 
P. ( I’ II Q ). ( R 1 S ) t Q 
This shows that in starching for a proof. one has to be careful not to stop after the 
first failure. Since tht: contraction rule cannot bc dispensed with. it is not ob\,ious at all 
that provability of an intuitionistic propositional sequent is a decidable property. In 
fact. it is. but pro\inp it requires :I fairlv subtle argument. WC will present an argument 
due to Kleenc. For the time being. MC return to classical logic. 
Proof. WC prove the slightly more pcncral claim. 
The proof of the claim is by induction on the structure of the proof tree and uses 
Lemma 8.5. I__1 
We can now prove that in classical logic the contraction rules arc needed only for 
the quantifier rules. 
Proof. First, by Lemma 8.4. we know that it is sufficient to consider proofs with 
atomic axioms. We establish the following claim. 
The claim is proved by induction on the pairs 
((lA,l....,IA,,,I,IB~l...., IB,,l;,h). 
where (IAIl, . . . . IA,,,I.lBII . . . . . lB,,/) is the multiset of the sizes of the formulae 
A ,,...r A,,,B ,....r B,,, and 11 is the depth of l7. When A, is of the form 
A A B, A v B, A I B or V’sA, or B, is of the form A A B, il v B. A 1 B or 3sA. we use the 
induction hypothesis and Lemma 8.5. When A, is of the form 3zA or B, is of the form 
V.xA. we use Lemmas 8.5 and X.6. In this case, the multiset component is always 
reduced. K 
Since the weakening and the contraction rules are derivable in XX L?.A.“.v.‘.l. it is 
possible to convert every proof in YL7.A.“.V.3.’ into a proof in Y.X ~?.h~‘~v~3~1. Thus. 
the systems :$F.A.v.y.3. 1 L 
and q$,‘,T.^,“.“.3.- are equivalent. Note in passing that 
a semantic proof can also be given. Indeed. it is possible to show that %Y’~?~“.“.~.~.~ 
is complete (see [6]). Also, as suggested by Peter Baumann, it is possible to prove 
directly that every proof in /9‘?.n.“.Y.3.L can be converted to a proof in 
9.Y ; ? A L- ~‘.3. I, Given a proof” in ,~‘~.Ai.i.L.j. 1. the idea is to eliminate one by one 
all top-level instances of contraction rules in I7. For every such subproof n’, every 
inference above the root is not a contraction. This allows us to work with contraction- 
free proofs in M ?.n.“.Y.3. I. L and to prove lemmas analogous to Lemmas 8.5 and X.6. 
We now present a cut-free system for intuitionistic logic which does not include any 
explicit contraction rules and in which the premise of every sequent can be interpreted 
as a set. Using this system !/i.W, due to Kleenc (see [XI system G&r. p. 4811). we can 
give a very nice proof of the decidability of probability in intuitionistic propositional 
logic. The idea behind this syslcm is to systematically keep a copy of the principal 
formula in the premise(s) of cvcry left rule. Since Lemma 8.7 firils for intuitionistic 
logic. such ;I system is of interest. 
Definition 8.8. The axioms and inference rules of the system ‘4.8 in.‘.“.‘.‘. ’ for 
intuitionistic first-order logic are 
PI. 1‘ t .-i 
I,[‘ t,‘l 
‘4 AB..1.B.I. )_c 
~~ (A: left) 
I‘ t.4 I‘tB 
.,I A N, I‘ t c 
~ ~ ~~~ ( A: right) 
I‘titvB 
AvB,A,l- tC .A v B. R. 1‘ t C‘ 
-l v B. I‘ cc 
-~~ ( v: left) 
2!ZIC (v: right) 
I‘E13 
f- FAvB 
,. ~ ,~ v u ( v: n&t) 
where in (V: right),!’ does not occur free in the conclusion: 
3rA, A [x I]. 1. F (‘ I‘ t_.4[1.2] 
3.YA. 1‘ kc 
(3 left) 
I‘ t 3.Y11 
(3: right) 
where in (3: left), J’ does not occur free in the conclusion. 
The variable 1‘ is called the ci!/c~rlr.lrritrh/~, of the inference. 
As noted in the discussion before Definition 4.3. if we consider sequents in which the 
right-hand side is nonempty, using axioms of the form 
1.f t/l 
is equivalent to using the rule 
I‘ tl 
F-tA (I: right) 
with A # 1. However. the axioms I, I’ )_ il are technically simpler to handle and. 
thus, we prefer them to the rule (I: right). Thus, from now on. we will assume that 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of I7. The case where the last 
inference (at the root of the tree) is a contraction follows by the induction hypothesis. 
Otherwise. the sequent to be proved is either of the form r k D, where r is a set, or it 
is of the form d, A, A t D. The first case reduces to the second since I‘ can be written 
as -4. A. and. from a proof of 3, A b D, we easily obtain a proof of ,4. A, A ED. If the 
last inference applies to a formula in d or D, the induction hypothesis yields the 
desired result. If the last inference applies to one of the two A’s. we apply the induction 
hypothesis and observe that the rules of ~43’~ have been designed to automatically 
contract the two occurrences of A that would normally be created. For example, if 
,4 = B A C, the induction hypothesis would yield a proof of 3, B A C, B, C k D con- 
sidered as a set. and the (A: left)-rule of :W”, yields ,I. U A C t D considered as 
a set. .~ 
As a corollary of Lemma 8.9. we obtain the fact that provability is decidable for 
intuitionistic propositional logic. Similarly. Lemma 8.7 implies that provability is 
decidable for classical propositional logic. 
Proof. By the existence of the functions f and !g. there is a proof of a proposition 
A in I ‘lz.!‘.‘.L iff there is a proof of the sequent k A in I~IY.r~.v.l.cu!. By the cut 
elimination theorem (Theorem 8.1). there is a proof in .i~.‘~.‘. ‘.“I’ iff there is a proof 
in ‘~,~- n. \/. I By Lemma 8.9. there is a proof in 3<.“.” .’ iff there is a proof in 
!$,~~,:.P.“. ’ Call a proof irwrllrrdtrr7t if for every sequent r t C in this proof, r is 
a set, and no sequent occurs twice on any path. If a proof contains a redundant 
sequent r F C occurring at two locations on a path. it is clear that this proof can be 
shortened by replacing the subproof rooted at the lower (closest to the root) location 
of the repeating sequent f t C by the smaller subproof rooted at the higher location 
of the sequent I‘ FC. Thus. a redundant proof in !$.W’i3,^.“.’ can always be 
converted to an irredundant proof of the same sequent. Now. by Lemma 8.9, we can 
assume that. for every proof in Y,w’~~.“.“.’ of a given sequent, every node is labeled 
with a sequent whose left-hand side is a set. Furthermore, since we are considering 
cut-free proofs, only subformulae of the formulae occurring in the original sequent to 
be proved can occur in this proof. Since the original sequent is finite. the number of all 
subformulae of the formulae occurring in this sequent is also finite and. thus, there is 
a uniform bound on the size of every irredundant proof for this sequent. Thus, one 
simply has to search for an irrcdundant proof of the given sequent. 
By the cut elimination theorem (Theorem X.1). there is a proof in Y‘?.‘.‘. ‘.“” iff 
there is a proof in ‘G,. * By Lemma X.7. there is a proof in !qi?-“.“.l iff there is 
a proof in CC.x’, “’ .‘. ’ To conclude, note that every inference of !!Y.X’,?.A’“. ’ 
decreases the total number of connectives in the sequent. Thus. given a sequent. there 
are onty finitely many proofs for it. 1-1 
As an exercise. the reader can show that the proposition 
known as Picrw’s /r/u,. is not provable in I ‘;. n .‘. but is provable classically in 
‘q .:’ ./_ I 
I 
The fact that in any cut-free proof (intuitionistic or classical) of a propositional 
sequent only subformulac of the formutac occurring in that sequent can occur is an 
important propert) called the .s~hfi~rr~~r/rr /~~c>pc~t~~. The subformula property is not 
preserved by the quantifier rules. and this suggests that provability in first-order 
intuitionistic logic or classical logic is undecidable. This can indeed be shown. 
9. Invertible rules 
If one is interested in algorithmic proof starch for a certain logic. then a cut-free 
sequent-calculus formulation of this logic is particularly welt suited because of the 
subformula property. In this case, the property of inwrfihiliry of rules is crucial. Given 
that the infcrcnce rules for sequent calculi are of the form 
or 
we say that a rule of type (a) is irlrrrtihlc when f’ k A’ is provable if?’ r td is 
provable. and that ;I rule of type (b) is irlrwtihlc when I“ t .I’ is provable iff both 
I‘, t 4, and I-, t ,/I, are provable. For usual inference rules. we can claim only that 
the conclusion of ;I rutc is provable if the premises are provable. but the converse does 
not necessarily hold. When a cut-free sequent calculus has invertible rules and there is 
some measure of complexity such that the complexity of each premise is strictly 
smaller than the complexity of the conclusion, then we have a decidable proof system. 
This is the case of the propositional system !G.%“,“-^,“.’ or the system ?YNi2.^.“. ’ 
obtained from the system 
adding the negation rules 
I‘ )_A, A 
1.4.r tA 
(1: 
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of Definition 8.3 by deleting the axiom 1. r E/l, A and 
left) 
,4. r E il 
~--~ (1: right) 
I- t Al,4 
(the full systems also have invertible rules. but the complexity of the premises of 
quantifier rules is not smaller than the complexity of the conclusion). Systems of 
invertible rules for classical logic arc used systematically in [6] (see Sections 3.4 and 
5.4). In our opinion. such systems are best suited for presenting completeness proofs in 
the most transparent fashion. 
One of the major differences bctkvcen Gentzen systems for intuitionistic and 
classical logic presented so far is that, in intuitionistic systems. sequents are restricted 
to have at most one formula on the right-hand side of k. This asymmetry causes the 
( 3: left)- and ( v: right)-rules of intuitionistic logic to be different from their counter- 
parts in classical logic and. in particular. the intuitionistic rules cause some lo.ss of 
information. These rules are /IO /or~~~r~~ invertible. For instance. the intuitionistic ( 1: 
left)-rule is 
I- t A B.!- EC 
.4 I B, P F C 
(3: left) 
whereas its classical version is 
I’t“1.c B, I‘ t C ~~ (3: left) 
A 3 B, I‘ t c 
Note that C is dropped in the left premise of the intuitionistic version of the rule. 
Similarly. the intuitionistic ( v: right)-rules are 
,.:s ( v: right) “ tB -~ ( v: right) 
I- FilvB 
whereas the classical version is 
;‘:ftB ( v: right) 
Again. either ,4 or B is dropped in the premise of the intuitionistic version of the 
rule. This loss of information is reponsible for the fact that in searching for a proof of 
a sequent in Cg,:‘.‘,‘. ‘. ‘. . one cannot stop after having found a deduction tree which 
is not a proof (i.e. a deduction tree in which some leaf is not labclcd with an axiom). 
The rules may have been tried in the wrong order. and it is necessary to make sure that 
rrll attempts have failed to be sure that a sequent is not provable. In fact. proof search 
should be conducted in the system %.;Y’i=.^.v.‘~3- ‘. since we know that searching for 
an irrcdundant proof terminates in the propositional case (see Theorem 8.10). 
Takeuti [?4] has made an interesting observation about invertibility of rules in 
intuitionistic cut-free sequent calculi but. before discussing this observation. we shall 
discuss other contraction-free systems for intuitionistic propositional logic for which 
decidability of provability is immediate. Such systems were discovered in the early 
fifties by Vorob’cv [3X, 391. lntcrest in such systems has been revived recently due to 
some work in automated theorem proving by Dyckhoff [S]. on the embedding of 
intuitionistic logic into linear logic (without using the cxponentials) by Lincoln ct al. 
1231, and on the complexity of cut elimination by Hudelmaier [S]. In order to simplify 
the discussion, we first consider propositional intuitionistic logic based on the con- 
nective 3. The system ~~.Wi~’ of Definition 8.8 restricted to propositions built LIP only 
from 3 is 
A 1 B,r t.4 il 1 B, B. 1’ t C A.r LB 
A 3 B, I‘ t C 
( 3: left) ~-- (2): right) 
I‘ t.4 3 B 
This system is contraction-free, but it is not immediately obvious that provability is 
decidable. since A 1 B is recopied in the premises of the (I: left)-rule. First, note that 
because the systems $x’i‘. A. \.b.j. L Lin,-j ‘q:. ’ b .v.g. 1 are equivalent and because cut 
elimination holds for 3 f * ’ ‘. ‘. ’ . cut elimination holds also for 5~‘,~‘.“,.’ .d.‘. I. In 
fact, it is easy to verify that cut elimination holds for CO? im Now. it is easy to see that 
wc can require ,4 to bc atomic in an axiom, and to see that we can drop il 2 B from the 
right premise and obtain an equivalent system. The new rule is 
Indeed. if we have a proof of .4 3 B. B. I‘ t C, since 13.1. )_ A 3 B is provable, by a cut 
we obtain that the sequent B. P k C is provable. Now, the ditticulty is to weaken the 
hypothesis A 3 B in the left premise. What is remarkable is that when A itself 
is an implication. that is when .4 1 B is of the form 03’ 1 B’) 3 B, then 
((A’ I B’) 3 B) E( B’ 3 B) is provable. Furthermore, ,4’,( B’ 3 B) t(( il’=) B’) 1 B) 
is also provable. As a consequence. for any I’ and any propositions A’, B’. B, D. the 
sequent I..((A’xB’)=,B) t(.4’ 1 D) is provable iff the sequent r,( B’ 1 B) t 
(A’ I D) is provable. Then. it can bc shown that B’ 1 B does indeed work. Also, when 
A is atomic, the rule ( 3: left) is simplified to ;I one-premise rule. The above discussion 
is intended as a motivation for the system Y’ y .F I’ presented next, but we warn the 
reader that the equivalence of the new system Y’,gX 7 with the previous system 
Y.Wi3 is not as simple as it seems. The new system Y’y .F r (which is a subsystem of 
Dyckhoff’s system [S]) is 
P. I‘ t P 
*i-k (3: left) 
L3zC.P ~AIB C,I’ED 
(,4 ~b)=C,r tD 
( 3: left) 
A.r LB 
l-)_,43B 
(I: right) 
where P is atomic. 
As mentioned earlier, the equivalence of the new system S?‘Y,eF 3 with the previous 
system 9.X: is a bit challenging. A nice proof is given in [S]. 
As an interesting application of the system F#Y I, we observe that the sequent 
is provable. However, this sequent is not provable in ‘~; without using a contraction. 
Indeed, the only cut-free and contraction-free proof of this sequent would require 
proving (((P I Q) I P) I P) in 97. However, this proposition is none other than 
Pierce’s law, and we leave it to the reader to verify that it is not provable in the system 
p.es 3 I 
In showing that intuitionistic propositional logic can be embedded in linear logic 
(without using the exponentials), Lincoln et al. [23] use a system ~JYlrpy* almost 
identical to 6”f.F I, except that instead of the rule 
they use the rule 
rtp B,r tC 
PxB,r )_C 
( 3: left) 
with P atomic. This second rule is obviously sound, and it is trivial to prove that the 
rule 
is derivable from the rule 
rtP B,I- I--C 
PIBB,l- tC 
( 3 : left) 
Thus, the proof of the equivalence of 6pfFz and 9.Xi1 directly implies the equiva- 
lence of .YY;yY* and ‘9X’: (but the converse is not obvious). However, as far as proof 
search goes, the system 9%~ 7’ is superior since it avoids the work done on trying to 
derive P in favor of waiting until it is obvious. On the other hand, JYY* is the right 
system for the translation into linear logic. 
Actually, it is possible to formulate a contraction-free system _Y’/aS’, A, “.’ for the 
whole of intuitionistic propositional logic. Such a system given in [S] is shown below. 
Definition 9.1. The axioms and inference rules of the system FfF3‘ *. “,’ are 
p,r TV 
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where P is atomic; 
;‘:;I,‘,:. (A: left) “ y_‘k.l iz’” (A: right) 
A,T FC B,r tC 
AvB.r EC 
( v : left) 
,‘,‘a: B (v: right) r L:z B ( v : right) 
where P is atomic: 
AI(BIC).~ tD 
(AAL3)IC.r tLI 
(3: left?) 
AICC,BIC.r tD 
(3: left,) 
(AvB)1C.f LD 
BzC,l‘ tA1B C.1‘ tD 
(A1B)IC.r I_D 
--~ (3: left,) 
,“l:-“, (I: right) 
Among the (2: left)-rules. notice that only (2: left,) is not invertible. The equiva- 
lence of Y/‘B .F 3. A. “. ’ and Y.iy’,‘, A. “.’ is shown in [S]. 
A nice feature of the system Y,f.T3. A. V.L is that it yields easily the decidability of 
provability. Note that. under the multiset ordering, the complexity of the premises of 
each rule decreases strictly (we consider the multiset of the weights \v(A) of the 
formulae A occurring in each sequent. We have K’(L)= 1, HI(P)= 1 for an atom, 
~~(AvB)=w(A~B)=~v(A)+H~(B)+I. and N(AAB)=w(A)+w(B)+~). For example, 
in rule ( 2: left,). (A I B) 1 C is replaced by B 1 C and A 3 B, both of (strictly) smaller 
complexity. Thus, this system requires no test of circularity (test for the repetition of 
sequents to find irredundant proofs), unlike in the sytstem Y.YiZ. A. “.l. 
Pitts [25] reports on applications of the system Y’,f.Y to intuitionistic logic with 
quantification over propositional letters. with interesting applications to the theory of 
Heyting algebras. An in-depth study of invertibility and admissibility of rules in 
intuitionistic logic can be found in Roziere’s elegant thesis [28]. 
We now come back to Takeuti’s observation 134, Chapter I. paragraph 81. The 
crucial fact about intuitionistic systems is not so much the fact that sequents are 
restricted so that the right-hand sides have at most one formula. but that the 
application of the rules (I: right) and (V: right) should be rrstvicted so that the 
right-hand side of the conclusion of such a rule consists of a sinyle formula (and 
similarly for (1: right) if 1 is not treated as an abbreviation). The intuitive reason is 
that the rule (2: right) moves some formula from the left-hand side to the right-hand 
side of a sequent (and similarly for (1: right)), and (V: right) involves a side condition. 
Now, we can view a classical sequent r k B1, . , B, as the corresponding intuitionis- 
tic sequent r t-B1 v ... v I?,,. With this in mind, we can show the following result. 
Lemma 9 2 Let ‘g,y.3. A. v.v.3.L . . . I he the system 9,‘. A. “.‘.‘. ’ byhere the application of 
the rules (I: riyht) and (V: riyht) is restricted to situations in which the conclusion qf the 
infkmce is a sequent ~%osr right-htrnd side ILLS a siny/e,formula. Then r t B1 , . , B, is 
proccdde in <9X?. A. V .v.3.’ ifr FB, v v B,, is pr()ouhle in {q:.A.v.v.3.L, ,, 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of proofs. In the case of an axiom 
A, r I- A, A. letting D be the disjunction of the formulae in A, we easily obtain a proof 
ofA r IDvA in~~.2~A~“.v.3.1 by applications of ( v : right) to the axiom A, r t-A. 
Similarly, I, r k D \: A is provable since it is an axiom. It is also necessary to show 
that a number of intuitionistic sequents are provable. For example, we need to show 
that the following sequents are intuitionistically provable: 
AIB,(AvD)A(B=,D) FD, 
(AvD)r\(BvD) t(Ar\B)vD, 
A [r/s] v D t 3.uA v D, 
Dvl tDvA. 
CvCvD tCvD. 
Goingfrom~.~~.^.".V.3,1toB'.".~.Q.3.1, it is much easier to assume that the cut 
rule can be used in ‘pi, and then use cut elimination. For example, if the last infer- 
ence is 
r tA,A B.r tA 
A1B.r LA 
( 3 : left) 
letting D be the disjunction of the formulae in A, by the induction hypothesis, we have 
proofs in y?, A. v.v.3. ’ of r k A v D and B, r C-D. It is obvious that we also 
have proofs of A I B, r t A v D and A 3 B, r t Bx D and, thus, a proof of 
AIB,r t(AvD)r\(BxD). Since the sequent AxB,r,(AvD)r\(BID) tD is 
provable, using a cut, we obtain that A I B, r t-D is provable, as desired. The reader 
should be aware that the special case where A is empty can arise and deserves special 
treatment. In this case, D corresponds to 1. We have treated only the case where A is 
nonempty. The case where A is empty is actually simpler and is left to the reader. The 
other cases are similar. 17 
We can also adapt the system ?x’,?, A. “.‘.‘.’ to form a system YGY’x~,~~ “.v.3.1 
having the same property as %‘.F-,3, A. “.‘~‘.’ In this system, it turns out that it is 
necessary to recopy only the principal formula in the rule (2: left), and, of course, in 
the rules (V: left), (3: right). Such a system can be shown to be complete w.r.t. Kripke 
semantics and can be used to show the existence of a finite counter-model in the case 
of a refutable proposition. This system is given in the next definition. 
Definition 9.3. The axioms and inference rules of the system Y.x’.T,~. A. “.v,3.1 are 
A.T CA.A 
I,P LA. A 
A,B.l‘ C3 r tA,A r tA.B 
Ar\B.r tA 
( A : left) 
I’I_A.Ar\B 
( A: right) 
A,r t/I B,I’ c-n 
ilvB,r tA 
( v : left) LLAAffB (v: right) 
AxB,I‘tA,A B,l- tn 
( 3 : left) 
A,r tB 
A 2 B, 1‘ t .1 r kA3B.n 
( 3: right) 
V’sA, A [T,'.Y]. I‘ t A 
(V: left) 
1‘ k A [J,‘x] 
V.YA,T t/l -,- tv’sA, ,4 W: right) 
where in (V: right). J‘ does not occur free in the conclusion: 
A [ J;.Y]. r t A 
~~- (3: left) 
r F A, A [T/.X]. 3sA 
3sA,T tn r tA,ZuA 
(3: right) 
where in (3: left). 1’ does not occur free in the conclusion. 
In the system <q.iv’.FT. A. v. b.3.1, the application of the rules (I: right) and (V: right) 
is restricted to premises whose right-hand side have a single formula. Using lemmas 
analogous to Lemmas 8.5, 8.6. and 8.7, it is possible to show that (contraction) and 
(weakening) arc derived rules, and that this system is equivalent to Y?. A’ “.v.3.i, in 
the sense that a sequent r b B,. . . . . B,, is provable in Y.=7-Xi~~n~“~v~3~’ iff 
1‘ t B, v ‘.. v B,, is provable in Y,“. A. “.v.3.1. However, Lemma 8.5 now fails for 
propositions of the form A 3 B or Y’sA. However, it can be shown that all the rules are 
invertible except (3: right) and (V: right). These rules are responsible for the crucial 
nondeterminism arising in proof search procedures. However, it can be shown that the 
strategy involving in alternating phases in which invertible rules are fully applied and 
then one of the rules (13: right) or (V: right) is applied once is complete. As a matter of 
fact. this strategy amounts to building a Kripke model in the shape of a tree. Failure to 
complete this model corresponds to provability.” In the propositional case, it is also 
a The management of ctuanlilied formulae i!, xlually more complicated. For details. see [34. Chapter I. 
Section X]. 
possible to formulate a contraction-free system similar to the system .!Y#Y3, A. “.‘. 
Such a system is given in [S]. 
10. A proof-term calculus for Y’. A. v.v.3.‘.CUt 
Before we move on to the sequent calculi Y’X and YCf and a detailed proof of cut 
elimination for these systems, it is worth describing a term calculus corresponding to 
the sequent calculus %J’, A. v.v.3.1.cut. The idea behind the design of the term calculus 
of this section arose from inspiring conversations with Val Breazu-Tannen, whom 
I gladly thank. In this calculus, a sequent r t A becomes a judgement T*D M:A, 
such that, if r = A 1, . . , A,, then r * =x 1 : A,, , s,: A,, is a context in which the si are 
distinct variables and M is a proof term. Since the sequent calculus has rules for 
introducing formulae on the left of a sequent as well as on the right of a sequent, we 
will have to create new variables to tag the newly created formulae, and some new 
term constructors. The reader should pay particular attention to the use of the let 
construct as a mechanism for suspending substitution. 
Definition 10.1. The term calculus associated with !9i ~.A. V.V.3.l.CUt is defined as 
follows: 
f-,x:ADv:A 
.~:A, \t:A,rDM:B 
::A,TDlet zbex:A(czy:A in M:B 
(contrac: left) 
TDM:I 
TD V,(M): A 
(I: right) 
with A #I, 
1-DN:A x:A,rDM:C 
rDlet N be s:A in M:C 
(cut) 
x:A,y:B,l-DM:C 
::AAB,rDlet z be (v:A,y:B) in M:C 
( A : left) 
TDM:A l-D N:B 
TD(M,N):Ar\B 
( A : right) 
x:A,TDM:C y:B,l-DN:C 
=:A vB,rDcase 2 of inl(x:A)-M 1 inr(y:B)*N:C 
( v : left) 
rDi$Ei/AvB (v: right) TD i~~~~ v B ( v : right) 
I‘DM:A s.B,TDN:C 
z:AIB,TSlet rM be .u:B in N:C 
( 3 : left) 
r:A.l’DM:B 
rT:>(Es: A. M): A 3 B 
(I: right) 
.u:A[r.t].r[>bf:C 
~ (V: left) 
z:V’tA,r>let z-c be s:A[rjt] in A4:C 
TDA4:A [L4/f] 
TD(iu:r.M):VrA 
(V: right) 
where u does not occur free in r or V’t,4; 
s:A[u/t],l-DM:C 
of inx(u:~.s:A[u/t]) + M:C 
(3: left) 
z:3tA, I‘Dcasex z 
where u does not occur free 
I‘r/,izf:il [T;'l] 
P>> inx(r, ,M):3t.4 
in !.,3tA, or c’: 
(3: right) 
The use of the let construct in the cut rule and the rules (2: left) and (V: left) should 
be noted. The effect of the let construct is to su.spcv~d substitution and, thus, to allow 
more reductions to take place. Most presentations use the following alternate rules in 
which substitution takes place immediately: 
1‘GN:A r:A,rC;M:C 
l‘:> $1 [N/,y] :C -~- (cut) 
rC>M:A .Y : B. l-Y-. N : C 
Thus, in some sense, a reduction strategy has already been imposed. This (usual) 
presentation facilitates the comparison with natural deduction. but makes it imposs- 
ible to describe general cut elimination rules. For the sake of historical accuracy, note 
that essentially the same system appears in Section 2 of Girard’s classic paper [IO]. 
With our system, it is possible to write reduction rules that correspond to cut 
elimination steps (see Section 12). For example. 
let i.\-:,4.~1, be ::(AxB) in(let zMz be J,:B in N) 
-t let (let M, be \-:A in M,) be J’:B in N, 
let (!LI, N) be (s:A.!,:B) in P 
+ let !M be .\-:A in (let N be J’:B in P). 
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let (M,N) be (x:A,y:B) in P 
+ let N be y:B in(let M be s:A inp), 
let M be u:A in(let 2 be (.x:C,y:D) in N) 
+ let z be (s:C,J’:D) in(let M be u:A in N), 
let M be s:A in (N,,N,) 
+ (let M be x:A inNI, let M be x:A in N2). 
let M be x:A inx+M 
It can be shown that 
let N be x:A in M++ M[N/r]. 
However, the reduction rules corresponding to cut elimination are finer than 
B-conversion. This is the reason why it is quite difficult to prove a strong version of cut 
elimination where all reduction sequences terminate. Such a proof was given by 
Dragalin [4]. If the alternate rules 
l-C>N:A s:A,rDM:C 
rDM[N/s]:C 
(cut) 
TDM:A r:B,rDN:C 
z:AIB,TDN[(zM),!.Y]:C 
( 3 : left) 
x:A[r,‘t],rDM:C 
-_:V’tA.T3M[(~t),‘x]:C 
(V: left) 
are used, then the reduction rules take a different form; for example, 
let (M,N) be (s:A,y:B) in P -+ P[M,‘.Y,N/J’], 
This amounts to imposing certain strategies on the reductions in our calculus. In fact, 
it is possible to specify reduction rules imposing certain strategies, for example, eager 
or /a:~ evaluation. Such reduction strategies have been considered in a similar setting 
for linear logic by Abramsky [l]. 
The above proof term assignment has the property that if TD M: A is derivable and 
r E d, then n D M: A is also derivable. This is because the axioms are of the form 
r, x:A Ds:A. We can design a term assignment system for an _Yj’-style system. In 
such a system, the axioms are of the form 
s:ADr\:A 
and the proof term assignment for weakening is as follows: 
i-DM:B 
,-:A,TDlet 2 be _ in M:B 
(weakening: left) 
302 1. Gtrllicf 
Note that the above proof term assignment has the property that if f DM:A 
is provable and I-G A, then A 3 N: A is also derivable for some N easily obtainable 
from M. 
If, instead of the above (A: left) rule, we use the two _Y$-style rules 
then we have the following proof term assignment: 
x:A.fDM:C 
z:Ar\B,TDlet I be (s:A._) in M:C 
( A : left) 
~~:B,r?~.bl:C 
z:Ar\B,TDlet I be (_,y:B) in M:C 
( A : left) 
It is then natural to write the normalization rules as 
let (M, N) be (s:A, ) in P + let M be x:A in P, 
let (M,N) be (_.y:B) in P + let N be y:B in P. 
We note that for these new rules, the reduction is IUZJ, in the sense that it is 
unnecessary to normalize N (or M) since it is discarded. With the old rules, the 
reduction is generally eayrr since both M and N will have to be normalized, unless 
.Y or 2’ do not appear in P. Such aspects of lazy or eager evaluation become even more 
obvious in linear logic, as stressed by Abramsky [l]. 
We now consider some equivalent Gentzen systems. 
Il. The Gentzen systems Y’)” and 1/‘.%” 
Axioms of the form A, f t A. A are very convenient for searching for proofs 
backwards but, for logical purity, it may be desirable to consider axioms of the form 
A t A. We can redefine axioms to be of this simpler form but, to preserve exactly the 
same notion of provability, we need to add the following rules of weakening (also 
called thirzning). 
Definition 11.1. The rules of weakening (or thinning) are 
I‘tA l- tA 
A,T I-A 
(weakening: left) 
I- kA,A 
(weakening: right) 
In the case of intuitionistic logic, we require that A be empty in (weakening: right). 
One can also observe that, in order to make the (A : left) rule and the ( v : right) rule 
analogous to the corresponding introduction rules in natural deduction, we can 
introduce the rules 
A’r tA (A: left) B,r td 
Ar\B,r FA Ar\B,r tA 
( A : left) 
and 
I_‘t:.~~B (v: right) rLy,tfB (v: right) 
They are equivalent to the old rules provided that we add (contrac: left), (contrac: 
right), (weakening: left) and (weakening: right). This leads us to the systems _Y’# and 
SPX defined and studied by Gentzen [S] (except that Gentzen had also an explicit 
exchange rule, but we assume that we are dealing with multisets). 
Definition 11.2. The axioms and inference rules of the system Ipf for intuitionistic 
first-order logic are given below. 
A.-Corns: 
A tA 
Structural rules: 
ftA rt 
A,r tA 
(weakening: left) ___ (weakening: right) 
rtA 
A,A,r tA 
A r c A (contrac: left) 
rtA A,/4 t@ 
r.n ~0 (cut) 
Logicul rules: 
rtA TkB 
1-C-AAB 
( A: right) 
A,r tA 
B’r I- A (v: left) 
AvB,r tA 
rEzB (v: right) r:ytB (v: right) 
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TEA B,f FA 
AxB,r tA 
(3: left) tLEB (I: right) 
7’itr_: (7: left) *;a (1: right) 
In the logical rules above, A v B, A A B, A =) B, and 1 A are called the prirlcipal 
,fimmlae and A, B the si~lr ,fbrmultre of the inference. 
where in (V: right), J’ does not occur free in the conclusion; 
A [J/S], r k A r tA [T/S] 
3.~uA. r t/l 
(3: left) 
r t3zA 
(3: right) 
where in (3: left), J does not occur free in the conclusion. 
In the above rules. A and 0 consist of at most one formula. The variable J’ is called 
the eiyrn~~~i~rhle of the inference. The condition that the eigenvariable does not occur 
free in the conclusion of the rule is called the ri~qc~rutriahlr cotzditiot~. The formula V’sA 
(or 3rA) is called the p~in~ipu/,fij~mu/tr of the inference, and the formula A [T/X] (or 
A [J,;S]) the sill@ ,fi~m~r~~ of the inference. 
Definition 11.3. The axioms and inference rules of the system P’.Y for classical 
first-order logic are given below. 
A.Y~WJIS: 
A FA 
Structurul ru1r.s: 
l-Ed r tA 
A,r tA 
(weakening: left) 
I‘ k A, A 
(weakening: right) 
A,A.T tA 1’ t/l, A, A 
A,l- tA 
(contrac: left) !‘ t A A (contrac: right) 
r tA,A A,A c-0 
r,n c-A,@ 
(cut) 
A,P tA 
( A : left) 
B,r tA 
A A B, I‘ t A Ar\B,r FA 
( A : left) 
I‘tA,A I’tA.B 
r tA.Ar\B 
( A : right) 
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A.T Ed 
“’ td ( v: left) 
AvB,r EA 
rz,:t B (v: right) rz,:fB (v: right) 
I‘tA,A B.I‘tA 
A1B,f I-A 
(3: left) :LF::B (I: right) 
r tA,A 
(7: left) 
A,I’tA 
lA,f tA r tA.lA 
(1: right) 
In the logical rules above, A v B, A A B, A 3 B. and 1 A are called the principal 
fiwnzulue and A, B the side,fiwmulae of the inference. 
A [r.‘.~], I- t A 
- (V: left) 
I- t A. A [~~isl 
-V.xA,i- td l- tA,‘bA 
(V: right) 
where in (V: right), 4’ does not occur free in the conclusion; 
r tA, A[~,i.u] 
I- tA.3xA 
(3: right) 
where in (3: left), J' does not occur free in the conclusion. 
The variable _V is called the rkpzwwiuhle of the inference. The condition that the 
eigenvariable does not occur free in the conclusion of the rule is called the riyenziuri- 
ddr conditiorl. The formula V.uA (or 3.uA) is called the principal ,fi,rmula of the 
inference, and the formula A[T/x] (or A[J/x]) the sidr,formu/a of the inference. 
One will note that the cut rule (multiplic~~tiw version) 
f- FA,A A,/1 tO 
l-,/1 c-A,@ 
(cut) 
(with A empty in the intuitionistic case and 0 at most one formula) differs from the cut 
rule (urlditir~ version) 
r tA,A 
A,f‘ tA (cut) 
l- tA 
uSedin~~,~~^.“~V~3.1.‘U’orin~~i~,^~”~V.~.I~CU’,’ m that the premises do not require the 
contexts r, .4 to coincide, and the contexts A, 0 to coincide. These rules are equivalent 
using contraction and weakening. Similarly, the other logical rules of 93” (9%) and 
<$?.A. v.v.3.-,.cut /(‘3. A. v.V.3.1.cut 
‘ (./i ) are equivalent using contraction and weakening. 
12. Cut elimination in I/X (and Isrf) 
The cut elimination theorem also applies to Y’X and _!P$. Historically, this is the 
version of the cut elimination theorem proved by Gentzen [S]. Gentzen’s proof was 
later simplified by Tait 1321 and Girard [ 131 (especially the induction measure). 
A simplified version of Tait’s proof is nicely presented by Schwichtenberg 1291. The 
proof given here combines ideas from Tait and Girard. The induction measure used is 
due to Tait 1321 (the cut rank), but the explicit transformations are adapted from 
[9,13]. We need to define the cut rank of a formula, the depth of a proof, and the 
logical depth of a proof. 
Definition 12.1. The rlcq~~c~ 1 A / of a formula A is the number of logical connectives in 
A. Let I7 be an Y’.W’-proof. The (‘lit I.UU~~ c,(n) of I7 is defined inductively as follows. If 
I7 is an axiom. then c(n)=O. If I7 is not an axiom, the last inference has either one or 
two premises. In the first case, the premise of that inference is the root of a subtree n,. 
In the second case, the left premise is the root of a subtree II,. and the right premise is 
the root of a subtree I7,. If the last inference is not a cut. then if it has a single premise, 
c(n)=c(n,). else c.(n)=rnax(~(n,),(,(nz)). If the last inference is a cut with cut 
formula A, then ~(n)=max((IAl+I.~~(n,),~~(n2))). The depth of a proof tree l7, 
denoted as l/(n ), is defined inductively as follows: rl( n ) = 0 when I7 is an axiom, If the 
root of I7 is a single-premise rule. then t/(n)=r/(n, )+ I. If the root of n is a two- 
premise rule. then d(n )=max(tl(n, ). rl(nz))+ I. We also define the ICX@LI/ drpth of 
a proof tree n, denoted as I(n ). inductively as follows: /(n )=O when n is an axiom. If 
the root of I7 is a single-premise rule, then if the lowest rule is structural, 1(n)= /(n,), 
else /(n)=/(n,)+ I. If the root of I7 is a two-premise rule, then j(n)= 
max(lU7,Ll(nz))+ I. 
Thus, for an atomic formula. /A ) =O. Note that c(n)=0 iff I7 is cut-free, and that if 
I7 contains cuts, then c(n) is I + the maximum of the degrees of cut formulae in n. 
The difference between the depth (l(n) and the logical depth I(n) is that structural 
rules are not counted in /(n ). Both are needed in Lemma 12.3, r/(n) as an induction 
measure and r(n) to bound the increase on the size of a proof. We also need the 
definition of the function c~rp(rir, II p). 
rup( 111.0. I’ ) = p: 
This function grows extremely fast in the argument II. Indeed, rrp(m, l,p)=&‘, 
exp (m, 2, p ) = nP” and, in general, esl~(m. II, p) is an iterated stack of exponentials of 
height II, topped with a p: 
The main idea is to move the cuts “upward”, until one of the two premises involved 
is an axiom. In attempting to design transformations for converting an 9X-proof 
into a cut-free LPN-proof, we have to deal with the case in which the cut formula A is 
contracted in some premise. A transformation to handle this case is given below: 
n1 
r tA,A.A x2 
r tA,A A,/4 tO 
l-,A tA,O 
nl 7(2 
I- CA,A,A A,A t@ 712 
l-,/l tA,O,A A,.4 CO 
a 
r,A,A tA,O,O 
The symmetric rule in which a contraction takes place in the right subtree is not 
shown. However, there is a problem with this transformation. The problem is that it 
yields infinite reduction sequences. Consider the following two transformation steps: 
ni x2 
r kA,C,C C, C, A t 0 
r tA,C 
c*A t@ (cut) 
r,A kA,O 
712 
n1 C, C, A t 0 
r EA,C,C C.A PO 
l‘,A tA,O,C 
=G- 
r,A,A LA,@,@ 
r.n C-A,@ 
n1 772 
JTl r tA.C,C C,C,A LO 
r tA,C,C c. r. A t 1,O.C 
r,r,A tA,A,O,C,C 
r.A tA,O,C.C 
r,A kA,O,C 
r,A,A Ed,@,@ 
r,A k-d,@ 
712 
C, C, A k 0 
C,A CO 
The pattern with contractions on the left and on the right is repeated. 
One solution is to consider a more powerful kind of cut rule. In the sequel, the 
multiset r, nA denotes the multiset consisting of all occurrences of B # A in r and of 
1~ + n occurrences of A, where 171 is the number of occurrences of A in r. 
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Definition 12.2 (E.utrndrrl cut ,ule). 
l- t A. rizA HA,A LO 
where ~1. II > 0. 
This rule coincides with the standard cut rule when ITI= II = I, and it is immediately 
verified that it can be simulated by an application of the standard cut rule and some 
applications of the contraction rules. Thus, the system 9X” obtained from Y’.iy‘ by 
replacing the cut rule by the extended cut rule is equivalent to Y’X‘. From now on, we 
will be working with 9X+. The problem with contraction is then resolved, since we 
have the following transformation: 
We now prove the main lemma. for which a set of transformations will be needed. 
Proof. It proceeds by induction on tl(l 
ate subtrees of the proof tree 
7, )-trl(l 7,),” where n, and l7, are the immedi- 
There are several (non mutually exclusive) cases depending on the structure of the 
immediate subtrees n, and Hz. 
(I) The root of I7, and the root of Hz is the conclusion of some logical inference 
having some occurrence of the cut formula ,4 as the principal formula. We say that 
A is trctiw. 
‘The reader is warned that earlier versions of this proof used the wrong measure /(n, )+/(n,). Indeed. 
/(17, )+ I(f7,) does IIO/ decrease in the cast of the structural rules (in cases Z and 4 of the forthcoming proof). 
Every transformation comes in two versions. The first version corresponds to the 
case of an application of the standard cut rule. The other version, called the “cross- 
cuts” version, applies when the extended cut rule is involved. 
(i ( A : right) crnll ( A : left): 
By the hypothesis c(n,),c(n,)<IAl, it is clear that for the new proof Z7 we have 
c(n)<IAl, since c(~)=max((~B/+l,~(n,),c(rt~)}), IBI+l<lAI (since A=Br\C), 
c(n,)<c(I7,), c(nz)<c(Hl), and c(rc,)<c(fl,). It is also easy to establish the upper 
bound on l(n).6 
Cross-cuts version: Some obvious simplifications apply when either m = 0 or n = 0, 
and we show only the main case where m, n > 0. Let A = B A C: 
711 712 713 
r ä A,mA,B l- t A,mA, C B,nA,A c-0 
r tA,(tn+ 1)A (tt+ l)A, A EO 
i-,/l LA,@ 
Let Il; be the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to 
713 
Xl B,tzA,A tO 
r tA,tnA.B (n-t l)A,A t@ 
r,A tA,O,B 
and I74 the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to 
711 n2 
I- tA,mA,B r tA,tnA,C 713 
r tA,(m+ l)A B,nA,A LO 
B,r,A LA,@ 
and, finally, let I7 be 
n; n; 
I-,A kA,O,B B,T,A tA,O 
l-,I-,A,A tA,A,@,O 
r,A LA,@ 
“The simple fact that max(tr,h)<tr +h for (1. ha0 is used here and in the next cases, 
Since ~(XI)<(.(~I), c(z~)<c(~,), and c(n,)<c(I7,), by the induction hypothesis, 
we have c(fl;),~(fl;)<l Al, and it is clear that for the new proof I7 we have c(u)</,Q 
since~(~)=max((i~I+1,~(~;),~(~;)J),and(B~+l~~A~(sinceA=B~C).Itisalso 
easy to establish the upper bound on I(n). 
(ii) ( v : right) trtul ( v : left): 
Xl 712 x3 
I- tA,B B,A tO C,A to 
r tA,BvC BvC,A kc3 
By the hypothesis c(n,), c(n,)<l A 1, it is clear that for the new proof 17 we have 
4f7)<IAl, since c(II)=max((/BI+l, c(z,), 47r2))), IBI+l<IAI (since A=BvC), 
c(n1)<1.(L’,), c(n2)dc(h’2), and c(Tc~)<c(I~,). It is also easy to establish the upper 
bound on i(n). 
Cross-cuts wrsiott: Similar to (i) (some obvious simplifications apply when either 
171 =0 or tz = 0). 
(iii) ( 1: right) and (I: left): Left as an exercise. 
(iv) (1: right) crtd (1: left): 
711 712 
AI- tA A t0.A 
l- EA.lA 7A.A t@ 
n2 El 
A tO,A A,r FA 
* 
I‘, A t A, 0 
By the hypothesis a, c(II,)< 11 Al, it is clear that for the new proof H we have 
c(fl)G 114, since c(n)=max([IAl+l, (,(zl), c(n2))), c(z~)Gc(H,), and 
c(nz)<~(fl,). It is also easy to establish the upper bound on I(n). 
Cross-Cuts crrsion (some obvious simplifications apply when either t~~=O or 11 =O): 
Xl n2 
A,T tA,tn(lA) tl(lA),A tO,A 
r kA,(m+ l)(lA) (t?+l)(lA),A t@ 
r,A tA,O 
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Let 77; be the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to 
Zl 
A,f td,m(lA) =2 
and 77; the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to 
n2 
711 ~(1 A), A t@, A 
A,I‘ tA,m(lA) (n+l)(lA),A t@ 
A,l-,A Ed,@ 
and, finally, let 77 be 
77; 77; 
7.A tA,O,A A,T,A Ed,@ 
7-, 7-, A, A t A. A, 0, 0 
i-,A Ed,@ 
Since c(ni)<c(77,), c(r~~)<c(77~), by the induction hypothesis, c(77;),c(77;)< 
11 A /, and it is clear that for the new proof 77 we have c(n)< 11 AI, since 
c(n)=max( (lAl+l, c(L’;), c(n;)]). It is also easy to establish the upper bound 
on I(f7). 
(v) (V: right) a& (V: left): 
711 n2 
r t A, B[J’/.Y] B[t,‘.u], A E 0 
l- tA.V.uB V.xB. A t 0 
l-,/l EA.0 
In the above, it may be necessary to rename some eigenvariables in z, so that they are 
distinct from all the variables in 7. 
By the hypothesis c(n,),c(n2)<lV.xBI, it is clear that for the new proof 77 we have 
c(n)<lV’uBI, since c(77)=max((IB[t.lr]I+l, c(Tc,[~/J~]), c(n,))), L.(~c~[~/~])=c(Tc~), 
c(nl)<c(17,), and c.(~~)<c(77~). It is also easy to establish the upper bound on 7(77). 
Cross-cuts version (some obvious simplifications apply when either ni=O or ri=O): 
=1 n2 
I- ~A,wz(V.XB),B[J’/.X] B[t/x], n(V.xB), A t 0 
l- CA,(m+ I)(V’sB) (n+ l)(VxB), A k-O 
l-,/1 LA,@ 
Let n; be the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to 
x2 
n1 B[t:s], ff(V.YB). A t 0 
f- t,l,f?l(v.uB),B[~,‘.\-] - (fl + I)(V’sB), /I t 0 
I-..1 I-A,O,B[J~,.Y] 
and 77; the proof tree obtained by applying the induction hypothesis to 
and, finally. let n be 
In the above, it may be ncccssary to rename some eigenvariables in 77; so that they are 
distinct from all the variables in t. 
Since c(x,)<c(~~,) and (,(n2)<c(772). by the induction hypothesis, c(n;). 
r~(n~)<lV.u~l, and it is clear that for the new proof 77 we have c(77)<lV’sBl, since 
L.(17)=max((/B[t,‘\-]~+l.(~(n;[r,’~~]). c,(nl,)))and c(n;[t;~~])=c(n;). It isalsoeasy 
to establish the upper bound on I(77 ). 
(vi) (3: right) ~r~rl (3: left): 
In the above. it may be necessary to rename some eigenvariables in nZ so that they 
are distinct from all the variables in t. 
By the hypothesis (,(77, ),~(f7,),<l3\-Bl. it is clear that for the new proof 77 we have 
L,(n)d13.dq, since c,(n)=m2tx( ; jL?[t:r]~ + I. ~(71~ ),c(TI~[~.!v]))). L,(~~~[~,‘J.])=(.(TI~). 
c(n,)<c(I7,). and c(z2)6~,(n2). It is also easy to establish the upper bound on I(n). 
Cwss-cuts rcwsim (some obvious simplifications apply when either rn =O or II =O): 
Similar to (v) and left as an exercise. 
(2) Either the root of Kl, or the root of fl, is the conclusion of some logical rule, the 
cut rule. or some structural rule having some occurrence of a formula X # A as 
principal formula. We say that A is passirr. 
We show only the transformations corresponding to the case where A is passive on 
the left, the case in which it is passive on the right being symmetric. For this case 
(where A is passive on the left), we only show the transformation where the last 
inference applied to the left subtree is a right rule, the others being similar. 
(i) ( v: right): 
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f tA,mA,B n2 
l- tA,rnA,BvC nA, /I LO 
I‘,,4 tA,O,BvC 
711 n2 
l- tA,mA,B nA,/l LO 
=z- 
r.A tA,O,B 
l-, A t A, 0, B v C 
Note that c(Tc,)<c(~,) and c(rr,)<c(H,). We conclude by applying the induction 
hypothesis to the subtree rooted with r, A t A, 0, B. It is also easy to establish the 
upper bound on /(n). 
(ii) (A : right): 
l-./1 tA,O.Br\C 
=I 713 n2 713 
I- td.r~A,B nA.A tO l- FA,mA,C nA,A t@ 
l-,A tA,O,B I‘.A tA,O,C 
- 
r,A tA,O,Br\C 
Note that ~(rri)<c(H,), c(Tc~)Gc(~,), and c(n,)<~(H,). We conclude by applying 
the induction hypothesis to the subtrees rooted with r, A t A, O,B and 
r, A t A, 0, C. It is also easy to establish the upper bound on r(n). 
(iii) (3: right): Left as an exercise. 
(iv) (1: right): 
l-,A tA,O,lB 
Note that c(n, )dc(H,) and c(rc2)<c(IJz). We conclude by applying the induction 
hypothesis to the subtree rooted with B.r,A I-A,@. It is also easy to establish the 
upper bound on /(n ). 
(v) (V: right): 
I-. A tz1.O.V.~B 
In the above. some renaming may be necessary to ensure the eigenvariable condition. 
Note that (,(nl[-.‘!‘])=(,(n,), c(n, )<c(fl,). and c(Tc~)Gc(Z~,). We conclude by 
applying the induction hypothesis to the subtree rooted with I‘. ‘4 k A, 0, B[q’s]. It is 
also easy to establish the upper bound on I(n). 
(vi) (3: right): 
I‘ t .I, VIA. B[r..\-] 712 
f t- 3, HIA, 3sB t1.4, ‘1 k 0 
I‘.>4 tA.O.3rB 
I‘, /I t ‘I,@. B[t.!z] 
I‘. /l t ,I. 0.3.~ B 
Note that c(x~)<c,(~,) and ~(z~)<c(fl~). We conclude by applying the induction 
hypothesis to the subtree rooted with r‘, 4 t A. 0, B[t/s]. It is also easy to establish 
the upper bound on /(f7 ). 
(vii) (cut): 
where in the above proof II, 1~1~ +m2=m, r=rl,A,, and A=Ai,O,. Since, by 
hypothesis, c(L’,),c(l7,)<lAl and c(n,)=max( [lBl+ 1, c(ni), ~(71~))). we must have 
lBI<IAl,~(7~,)~IAl,(.(~~)~IAl,and~(7~~)~IA~.Thus,inparticular,B#A. Weshow 
the transformation in the case where r7r1 >O and 1~12 >O, the cases where either rn, =0 
or JJI? =0 being special cases. 
Let I7; be the result of applying the induction hypothesis to 
let Hi be the result of applying the induction hypothesis to 
and let n be the proof 
Since, by the induction hypothesis, c(fi’;),c(n;)<lAl, and since lBl<l Al, we have 
c(n)<1 Al. It is also easy to establish the upper bound on r(n). 
(viii) (contrac: right): 
l- t A, B, B, INA 712 
r t A, B, IJIA nA,A t@ 
l-,A &A.O,B 
nl x2 
r kd,B,B.t~zA nA, A l-O 
=G- 
r,A tA,O,B,B 
r.A tA,O,B 
Note that c(rr,)<c(f7,) and c(rr2)<c(n2). We conclude by applying the induction 
hypothesis to the subtree rooted with r, A I- A, 0, B, B. It is also easy to establish the 
upper bound on 1(n). 
(ix) (weakening: right): 
711 
r tA,mA 712 
l- kA,mA.B nA,A t@ 
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Note that c(rr,)<c(77,) and ~.(rr~)<c(77~). We conclude by applying the induction 
hypothesis to the subtrees rooted with 7, A td, 0. It is also easy to establish the 
upper bound on 7(77). 
(3) Either 77, or n2 is an axiom. We consider the case in which the left subtree is an 
axiom, the other case being symmetric: 
Note that ~(?r,),<c(77~). Since, by hypothesis, c(77,).~(77~)<lAl, it is clear that 
c(77,<1.41. 
(4) Either the root of 77, or the root of 77, is the conclusion of some thinning or 
contraction resulting in an occurrence of the cut formula A. We consider the case in 
which this happens in the succedent of the left subtree, the other case being symmetric. 
(i) (weakening: right): 
and when JJI, II > 0. 
nl 
7‘ t .1. fJl,4 71, 
I- td,(lJJ+ 1)/i HA, ‘1 to 
I‘,*4 LA.0 
Since, by hypothesis, we have I, c(n,)< 1 A). it is clear that c(n)< 1 Al in the first 
case. In the second case, since c(7-c1)<c(f7,) and c(7c2)<c(H2), we conclude by 
applying the induction hypothesis. 
(ii) (contrac: right): 
Since, by hypothesis, we have c,(n,),c(fl,)<I Al and since ~(n,)<c(I7~) and 
c(x~)<c(~,), we conclude by applying the induction hypothesis. n 
We can now prove the following major result (essentially due to Tait [32]), showing 
not only that every proof can be transformed into a cut-free proof but also giving an 
upper bound on the size of the resulting cut-free proof. 
Proof. We prove the following claim by induction on the depth of proof trees. 
Claim. Let I7 hrtr proofw?th cut rtrnk c(lZ),fiw LI seqwnt r t A. !fc(fI)>O therl we cm 
construct (1 proof ll’ ,fiw r t A SWII tht 
c(n’)<(qn) d I(n’)c4i(‘1b. 
Proof of claim. If either the last inference of I7 is not a cut, or it is a cut and 
c(I7 ) > j A I+ I, we apply the induction hypothesis to the immediate subtrees I7, or I7, 
(or i7,) of I7. We are left with the case in which the last inference is a cut and 
c( I7 ) = 1 A / + 1. The proof is of the form 
n, n2 
/- t A, ri7A nA.A t@ 
r,A LA,@ 
By the induction hypothesis, we can construct a proof l7; for f t A,mA and 
a proof I7i for HA, A F@, such that c(n;)<l Al and /(n;)<4’(“,‘, for i= 1,2. Applying 
the reduction lemma (Lemma 12.3) we obtain a proof n’ such that c(n’)<( Al and 
~(n’)~2(l(n;)+~(n;)). But 
2(l(n;)+r(n;))~2(41(‘71’+4 1, 7(71,) <qmax(7~77,,.f(172))+ I _4ftfl) 0 
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Proof of Theorem 12.4 (c,orzc,lu.siorl). Follows by induction on c(n), and from the 
definition of c.up(4, PI, n). ri 
It is easily verified that the above argument also goes through for the system y,p. 
Thus, we obtain Gentzen’s original cut elimination theorem. 
It is instructive to see exactly where (contraction) and (weakening) are actually used 
in the transformations. Contraction is used in the cross-cuts, in the case of axioms 
(case 3) and. of course, when it is the last inference of a proof (in cases 2 and 4). 
Weakening is used only in cases 2 and 4, and this because we have chosen the minimal 
axioms A t A. If WC‘ use the version of the cut rule (the dditiw version) in which the 
contexts are merged rather than concatenated 
I- tA,A A.1‘ td 
1. tn 
(cut) 
and the corresponding extended cut rule 
I- ~-d./nA riA, r t.4 
1‘ t/l 
(cut) 
WC can verify that contraction is no longer needed in the cross-cuts, but it is still 
needed for the axioms, and, of course, when it is the last inference of a proof (in cases 
2 and 4). If, in addition. we use the “fat” axioms A. I‘ Ed, A, it seems that the 
weakening rules are no longer needed. but this is. in fact, erroneous. It is true that 
weakening is not needed to handle the case of axioms (only contraction is needed), but 
in case 2 for (contrac: left) and (contrac: right), weakening is needed! (see case 2(viii) for 
example). This is somewhat annoying since the transformation rules for weakening 
discard one of the two subproofs appearing as premises of a cut. Indeed, as observed 
by Yves Lafont. it is this property which causes any two classical proofs to be 
identified under the equivalence relation induced by the reduction rules for cut 
elimination. The proof 
*I 712 
rtn I- t-A 
r tA.A A,l- LA 
reduces both to rri and rt2, showing that the equivalence of classical proofs induced by 
cut elimination is trivial. However, note that if we allow the new transformations 
which take a proof rc of a sequent r kA and create (the obvious) proof A +7~ of 
A, r E A and 7c + A of r t A, A, then weakening can be dispensed with, and I conjec- 
ture that the equivalence of proofs is nontrivial. Still, note that the proofs of the 
axioms A F A and B t B (with A #B) will be equivalent since they are both 
equivalent to the proof of A. B CA. B, but this does not seem to be problematic. The 
intuitionistic calculus does not suffer from the same problem: the equivalence of 
proofs induced by cut elimination is nontrivial (this can be seen by mapping sequen- 
tial proofs to natural-deduction proofs and using the normal-form property of 
I.-terms). 
From Theorem 12.4, we see that the complexity of cut elimination is horrendous, 
since the upper bound on the size of a cut-free proof is esp(4,c(fl),l(fl)), a super 
exponential. A careful inspection of the proof of Lemma 12.3 shows that 
I(~)<~(~,)+~(~,), except for case 1 (iii). This is the reason for the upper bound 
esp(4, c(n), l(n)), which applies even in the propositional case. However, Hudelmaier 
[ 191 has shown that for the system Y’g.F1. A. “.’ this upper bound can be reduced to 
a quadruple exponential. and in the classical case for a system similar to Y.iy“, A. “.’ 
to a double exponential. But nothing is obtained for free! Indeed, the lower complexity 
of cut elimination in the system Y</Y -I. A. “.’ is attained at the cost of the computa- 
tional expressive power of the system. In the system of natural deduction 1 ‘I. A, “.‘, 
the proposition (PI P)x(P 2 P) has infinitely many inequivalent proofs (in fact, the 
Church numerals for P). On the other hand, in YcfX1.A’ “.I, (PIP)I(P~P) has 
only finitely many proofs; in fact, only two, corresponding to the Church numerals 
“zero” and “one”. This is regrettable, but a cynic would not be surprised: there is no 
free lunch! 
The above considerations lead naturally to the following question: What is the 
exact relationship between cut elimination and (strong) normalization in intuitionistic 
logic’? In [40], Zucker makes an in-depth study of this relationship. Although Zucker 
obtains some very nice results in this formidable paper, he does not provide a com- 
plete answer to the problem. Intuitively, the reason is that the reduction relation 
induced by cut elimination transformations is finer than p-reduction (as alluded to in 
Section 10). Thus, the exact relationship between cut elimination and (strong) normal- 
ization remains a challenging open problem. For the latest results, see [36]. 
A few more remarks about the role of contraction and weakening will be useful as 
a motivation for linear logic. We already noted with the cut rule that contexts (the r, d 
occurring in the premise(s) of inference rules) can be treated in two different ways: 
(1) either they are merged (which implies that they are identical), or (2) they are 
concatenated. 
In order to search for a proof backwards, it is more convenient to treat contexts in 
mode 1, but this hides some subtleties. For example, the ( A : right)-rule can be written 
either as 
I- tA,A r kd,B 
l- I--A.Ar\B 
320 .I. Gtrllir, 
where the contexts are merged, or as 
I- tA,A A tO,B 
r.A tA,O.Ar\B 
where the contexts are just concatenated but not merged. Following Girard, let us call 
the first version ddifiw, and the second version rmdtiplicutk~. Under contraction and 
weakening, the two versions are equivalent: the first rule can be simulated by the 
second rule using contractions: 
I- tA,A r tA,B 
r,r tA,A,Ar\B 
I‘tA,Ar\B 
and the second rule can be simulated by the first rule using weakenings: 
l‘tA,A A tO,B 
l-,/l tA,O,A r.A FA.O,B 
I‘. A C_ A. -0, A A B 
Similarly, the ( A : left)-rules can be written either as 
A,I‘ t-A B,r &A 
A A B, r C/l AAB,r tn 
or as 
A,B,r LA 
A A B. 1. t A 
Again, let us call the first version ~~dditi~. and the second version rnultiplictrtice. 
These versions are equivalent under contraction and weakening. The first version can 
be simulated by the second rule using weakening: 
A.r tA 
A, B. r t d 
(weakening: left) 
A A B, r t z/I 
and the second version can be simulated by the first rule and contraction: 
A,B,r t3 
A A B, B. I‘ t 3 
A/\B,Ar\B,r LA 
AAB,r tA 
(contrac: left) 
If we take away contraction and weakening. the additive and the multiplicative 
versions are no longer equivalent. This suggests, and this path was followed by Girard, 
that we split the connectives A and v into two versions: the ,nulriplic,arillf~ version of 
A and v , denoted as @ and (.I, and the ndr/itil.e version of A and v, denoted as 
& and 0. In linear logic., due to Girard [l2], the connectives A and v are split into 
multiplicative and additive versions, contraction and weakening are dropped, nega- 
tion, denoted as A ‘, is involutive and, in order to regain the loss of expressiveness due 
to the absence of contraction and weakening, some new connectives (the exponentials 
! and ‘?) are introduced. The main role of these connectives is to have a better control 
over contraction and weakening. Thus. at the heart of linear logic lies the notion that 
resources are taken into account. 
13. Reductions of classical logic to intuitionistic logic 
Although there exist formulae that are provable classically but not intuitionisti- 
tally, there are several ways of embedding classical logic into intuitionistic logic. More 
specifically, there are functions * from formulae to formulae such that for every 
formula A, its translation A * is equivalent to A classically, and A is provable 
classically iff A* is provable intuitionistically. Stronger results can be obtained in the 
propositional case. Since 11 A 2 A is provable classically but not intuitionistically, 
whereas A 311 A is provable both classically and intuitionistically, we can expect 
that double negation will play a crucial role, and this indeed is the case. One of the 
crucial properties is that triple negation is equivalent to a single negation. This is 
easily shown as follows (in 9:“. A. “.-‘): 
A tA 
A,lA t 
Since we also have the proof (in YT.A.v. ~‘) 
IA FlA 
it is clear that 111 A ~1 A is provable intuitionistically. 
The possibility of embedding classical logic into intuitionistic logic is due to four 
crucial facts which we show step by step: 
(I) 111 A-1 A is provable intuitionistically. 
(2) If a formula A is provable classically without using the (V: right)-rule, then 
11 A is provable intuitionistically. 
(3) For a class of formulae for which 11 A t A is provable intuitionistically, (2) 
holds unrestricted. This means that if a formula A in this class is provable classically 
then 11 A is provable intuitionistically. 
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(4) For every formula A built only from 
P ,,..., 77PkzJP,,. where PI, . . ..Pk are all 
d,ll A E A is provable intuitionistically. 
3, A,T and V, if d=llP,~ 
the atoms occurring in A, then 
The “trick” of the double-negation translation (often attributed to Godel [16], 
although it was introduced independently by Kolmogorov [21] and Gentzen 181) is 
that if we consider a formula A built only from 3, A, 1, V, and replace every atomic 
subformula P by 11 P. obtaining A ‘. we get a subclass of formulae for which (4) 
holds without the d. and, thus, (3) also holds. For this class, A is provable classically iff 
A ’ is provable intuitionistically. 
Our first result concerns propositions. Given r= A,, . . . . A,,,, let llP=llA,, 
. . . . 11 A ,,,. 
Lemma 13.1. Gir.6~1 LI srquenr r t B, , , B,, of’ proposition.s, if‘ I’ t B, , . . , B,j is 
prorwhlr in Yz. A. “. I. tllcrl 11r kl(lB, A ... Al&,) is prol~clhle in ,i3.A.“.7. 
Proof. We proceed by induction on proofs. In fact. it is easier to work in 
<q,I.A.“. Y.c‘“, and use cut elimination. It is necessary to prove that a number of 
piopositions are provable intuitionistically. First, observe that if Al, ..,, A, FL? is 
provable in ,?.A.,. l.CLI(, then TFIA, ,.... 1lA,,, ETTB is also provable in 
Y’,^, “, l.CL”. The following sequents are provable in YF. A. “.~ml.CC’t: 
l(lAr\lBr\D) tl(l(AVB)AD), 
T(~AAD).TT~A tlD. 
Given d =D,, . . . . D ,,,, WC let D=lD, A ... AND,. This way, observe that 
i(iAr\lD, A . ..r\iD.,,)=i(iA AD). The reader should be aware that the case 
where !?I= 0 in d = D 1, . . D,, can arise and requires special treatment. In this case, 
D can be considered to be 11. Actually. if we add I and the axioms I, f t A, where 
d is either empty or a single formula. to ‘9;~ A.V. ‘.CU’. then 11 I = I and 
A A 1 I = A are provable, and we just have to simplify the above sequents accord- 
ingly. We proceed by assuming that ~13 I, leaving the case m =0 to the reader. 
Now, consider the axioms and each inference rule. An axiom r, A E A,A 
becomes ~~T,~~A tl(lA AD), which is provable in Y~,h.V.l.CU’ since 
11 A El (1 A A D) is. Let us also consider the case of the ( 3: right)-rule, leaving 
the others as exercises: 
l-, A EB, A 
f tA1B.A 
By the induction hypothesis, TTT,TFIA Fi(lBr\D) is provable in 
~9~‘. A v.l.CU1, and so is 
llf ~(~TAIT(TBAD)). 
Since 
(~~A~~(~Br\D)) I-l(l(A=,B)r\D). 
is also provable in !~i~.A.“.l.CL’t, by a cut, we obtain that 
is provable in ‘4.‘. A. “.l.Cu’ I , as desired. K 
In order to appreciate the value of Lemma 13.1, the reader should find a direct 
proof of ii(ilPIP) in Y~.A.“.l. 
Since 111 A ~1 A is provable intuitionistically, we obtain the following lemma, 
known as Glivenko’s lemma. 
Proof. By Lemma 13.1, using the fact that 111 A ~1 A is provable intuitionisti- 
tally, and that the sequent 
l(llB, A ... r\llB,,) tl (B, A ... A B,,) 
is provable in Cqi’. *, “.l. 0 
As a consequence of Lemma 13.1, if a proposition A is provable classically, then 
11 A is provable intuitionistically and, as a consequence of Lemma 13.2, if a proposi- 
tion 1 A is provable classically, then it is also provable intuitionistically. It should be 
noted that Lemma 13.1 ,fuils for quantified formulae. For example, VX(P(X) v 1 P(x)) 
is provable classically, but we can show that ~~V’u(P(s) vlP(.x)) is not provable 
intuitionistically, for instance using the system of Lemma 8.9. Similarly, 
V’rll P(s) 111 V.Y-P(.U) is provable classically but it is not provable intuitionisti- 
ally, and neither is 11 (V.ull P(s)r>llV.uP(.u)). As observed by Giidel. Lemma 
13.2 has the following remarkable corollary. 
Proof. (/JJ, irzrl~~fior~ OII il ). If .4 =1 13, then this follows by Glivenko’s lemma. 
Otherwise, it must be possible to write A =B, A ... A B,,. where each Bi is not a con- 
junct and where each Bj is provable classically. Thus, each Bi must be of the form 1 Ci 
since, if Bi is an atom, it is not provable. Again, each Bi is provable intuitionistically by 
Glivenko’s lemma, and. thus, so is A. r- 
Lemma 13.1 confirms that double negation plays an important role in linking 
classical logic to intuitionistic logic. The following lemma shows that double negation 
distributes over the connectives A and 1. 
Proof. We give proofs for 
and 
leaving the others as exercises. We have 
A.B tB 
A1B LA A,B,lB t 
A, A1B.113 t 
A,lB tl(AxB) 
A,JT(AIB),~B t 
11(A~B),1B t_lA 
ll(AxB),llA,~B I- 
+ (A=B)+ A k77B 
ll(AxB) tllAxlr~B 
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A LA 
lA,A t B,A F-B 
TA,A EB B FAIB 
IA C_AIB B,l(A1B) k 
T(AIB),TA F ~(AIB) LlB 
~(AIB) FTFIA lr~B,l(AxB) F 
T~A=,~TB,T(AxB) t 
~~A~~~IB kll(A~B) 0 
Lemma 13.4 firils for disjunctions. For example, 
is root provable in Yil. A. “.--’ since~~(Pv~P)isprovablebut(~~Pv~~~P)is 
not provable in Yiz.^. ‘.l (this is easily shown using the system !~~~i). Lemma 13.4 
,firil.s also for the quantifiers. For example, using the system of Lemma 8.9, we can 
show that ~‘x~~P(\-)~~~~‘rP(\-) and ii3xP(x)~3x~~P(x) are not provable 
intuitionistically. 
Even though Lemma 13.1 fails in general, in particular for universal formulae, 
Kleene [20, Theorem 59, p. 4921 has made the remarkable observation that the culprit 
is precisely the (V: right)-rule. Indeed, the lemma still holds for arbitrary sequents 
I‘ t B,, . . . . B,, provided that their proofs in Y,‘.^. “.l. ‘.’ do not use the rule (V: right). 
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 13.1, we proceed by induction on proofs. It is 
necessary to prove that the following sequents are provable in Yi”. *’ “.7.v,3: 
l(lA[t;s]r\D) tl(l3sAr\D), 
where x does not occur in D in the second sequent. Proofs for the above sequents 
follow: 
A [t;‘.~], D t A [t/x] 
A [t/s], D t 3sA 
A [r;‘.~], 13sA. D t 
13.~ A, D t 1 A [t/.x-] 13xA,D &D 
13sA.D tlArtjxlr\D 
l(lA[t,:s]r\D).l3.uA,D t 
~(1 A [t/x] A D ), 13s A A D t 
~(~A[t,ls]r\D) tl(l3sA~D) 
D. A [v,‘.Y] t A [)I, r] 
11 A [ J~/.Y] I 1 D, D, A [J./.X] t 
V.Y(TT AxlD),D, A[J’.~] t 
V.Y(~~A~~D),D.~.YA t 
V’x(11,4 11 D), D tl ~.YA 
Vs(11 A 31 D).ll3sA, D C 
where x does not occur in D. and _r is a new variable. 
D, A [t.s] t A [t,r] 
D, A [t/.x]. 1 A [t,‘.~] t D, A [t;.r] t D 
D, A[t,.‘r] tll A[r;‘s] 1 D, D, A [r.‘.~] t 
(llil [tm] 11 D). D. A [r/s] t 
(llA[f~.\-]~lD),D.~‘\-A F 
(1-l A[t/\-] 11 D), D tlb”sA 
(11 A[t;s] ~~D),~~V.\-A, D b 
(llA[t .Y]ITD).~~V.YA tlD 
We now have to consider the cases where the last inference is one of (V: left), (3: left), 
or (3: right). We treat the case of the rule (3: right), leaving the others as exercises. We 
have 
Given A = D,, . . . . D,,,, we let D =l D, A ... A 1 D ,,,. The reader should be aware that 
the case where rn=0 in d = D, , . . . . D,,, can arise and requires special treatment (as in 
the proof of Lemma 13.1). We proceed with the case where ~3 I, leaving the case 
rn=O to the reader. By the induction hypothesis. ill* tl(l A[tll.x] AD) is prov- 
able in ‘~I. h. v.~l.d.3, On the other hand, since the sequent 
~(1 A[r/s] A D) tl (13sA A D) 
is provable in <qi3.“’ b’. ‘.f.g_ using a cut, we obtain that the sequent 
llf tl (l&A AD) 
is provable in ‘~,~. /I. “. 1.Y.~ I , as desired. 0 
Technically, the problem with Lemma 13.5 is that the sequent 
(where x does not occur in D) is not provable in 9’. A, v.7,v.3. In order to see where 
the problem really lies, we attempt to construct a proof of this sequent: 
Vs1(1.4 AD),lVXA,D b 
V~~(~AAD),~V.~AAD t 
V.xl(lAr\D) tl(lVxA/\D) 
where x does not occur in D, and y is a new variable. The problem is that we cannot 
apply the (V: left)-rule before 1 VxA has been transferred to the right-hand side of the 
sequent (as VxA) and before the (V: right)-rule has been applied to VxA, since this 
would violate the eigenvariable condition. Unfortunately, we are stuck with the 
sequent ~(1 A [y/.x] A D), D t A [p/.x] which is unprovable in F?‘:, A. “,7.v.3. How- 
ever, note that the sequent ~(1 A [J?/.x] A D),D tii A[y/x], in which A [y/x] has 
been replaced with 11 A [r/.x], is provable in 97,“. “.7.v,3: 
D,lA[y/x] t-lA[y/x] D,lA[y/x] tD 
D,lA[y/x] klA[y/x] AD 
~(1 A [y/x] A D), D, 1 A [y/x] t 
l(lA[y/.x]AD),D tllA[y,‘x] 
Thus, if the sequent 11 A t A was provable in ?#‘.A. “,1,v.3, the sequent 
would also be provable in YiX, A, “.1.V,3. It is, therefore, important to identify a sub- 
class of first-order formulae for which 11 A t A is provable in <??I, A. “.J.‘,~ since, 
for such a class, Lemma 13.5 holds without restrictions. The following lemma, 
showing the importance of the axiom 11 P t P, where P is atomic, leads us to such 
a class of formulae. It is at the heart of the many so-called “double-negation 
translations”. 
Lemma 13.6. For eceryformula A built onlyfiom 3, A ,l,V, the sequent 11 A I-- A 
is provable in the system 9% A,7.ti obtainedfrom %?‘* A.l-v by adding all sequents of the 
form 11 P,r I-P, where P is atomic, as axioms. In the propositional case, if 
A =ll P, 3 P,, ..,-IT Pk 3 Pkr where PI, .,. , Pk are all the atoms occurring in A, then 
A,11 A t A is provable in ‘37. A,7. 
Proof. It proceeds by induction on the structure of A. If A is an atom P, this is obvious 
since 11 P t P is an axiom. If A =B A C, by the induction hypothesis, both 
iiB tB and 1lC I-C are provable in %%A,7.v, and so is lr~Br\ 
iiC tB~C.Wejusthavetoprovethatll(B~C) tllBr\llCisprovable 
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in <gi3. A.7.vq which is easily done. If A =l B, 
111B FlB is provable in <GI’,‘. A l.V, so is 11 A 
induction hypothesis, 11 C t C is provable in !qi2 A 
since we have shown that 
t A. If A = B XI C’, then by the 
l.’ (and so is 1lB t B, but 
we would not need it). Observe that the sequent ~~CIC,J~(BIC) ~BIC is 
provable in !qF. A.l.V: 
BFB B.C tC 
B,(BIC) kc 
B,lC.(B~C) t 
B.lC El(B3C) 
ll(B~C),B,lC I_ 
ll(B~c),B LlmC TT(BIC),B,C tC 
llC~C’,1l(B~C),B tC 
Using the fact that 1lC tC is provable in Y~;‘.~‘.’ and a suitable cut, 
TT(BI,C) ä BIC is provable in !~iXYA~~‘.V, If A =V’sB, we can show easily that 
1lV’sB tllB[t:s] is provable in Y,‘. A. ~‘.‘. Since, by the induction hypothesis. 
11 B t B is provable in :qi2+, h. ~‘.‘, for any new variable ~1, TFIB[JVS] ~B[JI/.Y] is 
also provable in %‘2 A. ‘,‘, and, thus, by choosing t=y. the sequent 
11 V’uB t B [ J,/.Y] is provable, where j‘ is new. so that 11 V’sB t V’sB is provable in 
/(‘I, A.Fl.Y 
Ji+ n 
Unfortunately. Lemma 13.6 .firi/s for disjunctions and existential quantifiers. For 
example, 
llP3P ~ll(PVlP)3(PVlP) 
is not provable in .li (p2-n. “.7.‘.‘. This can be shown as follows. Since P VTP is 
provable in Y,‘. A. “.-l, by Lemma 13.l.~~(Pv1P)isprovablein~~~~*~“~’.Thus, 
11 P 2 P k(P v 1 P) would be provable in YiI. A. “.7.v.3, but we can show, using 
the system of Lemma 8.9, that this is not so. 
The sequent 
is also not provable in !qiY’ A. “. 1.v.3. This is because (113sP(s) 13.~11 P(x)) is 
provable in <g,T, A.v.m’.t(.3 without using the (V: right)-rule, and, so, by Lemma 13.5, 
11(113sP(r)~~zllP(s)) is provable in <giI, A. “. ‘.‘.‘. Then 
llP3P t(113.~P(.Y)33.\-11P(.Y)) 
would be provable in Yi’, A. “. ‘.‘,‘, but we can show. using the system of Lemma 8.9, 
that this is not so. 
Since the sequent A VT A tll A 1 A is easily shown to be provable in 
$I.A.“.l.V’.3 . Lemma 13.6 also holds with the axioms P t P v 1P substituted for 
11 P, P I-P (for all atoms P). In fact, with such axioms, we can even show that 
Lemma 13.6 holds for disjunctions (but not for existential formulae). 
In view of Lemma 13.6, we can define the following function ’ on formulae built 
from 2. r\,i,V: 
,4+=11/I if A is atomic. 
(lA)+=lA+, 
(A*B)+=(A+*B+) if *E(X, v), 
(v’sA)+ = VXA +. 
Given a formula built only from 3, A, 1, V’, the function + simply replaces every atom 
P by 11 P. It is easy to show that A and At are classically equivalent. The following 
lemma shows the significance of this function. 
Lemma 13.7. For every ,formula A built on/~~ ,fiorn 3, A ,l, V, the sequent 
11 At t At is procuhle in the system !‘qi3. n,7,v. 
Proof. Since~~~A~~Aisprovablein~~~^~‘~v,thesequent~~~~P~~~P 
is provable in Yi’,‘, A. --l,’ for every atom P, and, thus, the result follows from the 
definition of A + and Lemma 13.6. E 
Actually, we can state a slightly more general version of Lemma 13.7, based on the 
observation that 111 A ~1 A is provable in !9i2,A.1.v. 
Lemma 13.8. For ezleryformula A built only,from 3, A ,l, V and where euery atomic 
sut$ormula occurs negated (except _I_), the sequent 11 A t A is provable in the system 
<Iii. A.J.6 
The formulae of the kind mentioned in Lemma 13.8 are called negutive formulae. 
The following lemma shows that if we use double negation, then v, 1, and 3 are 
definable intuitionistically from the connectives A, 1, V. 
Lemma 13.9. The jbllowiny forrnulue are procahle in 9’. “.7,v: 
113sA-1V.x~ A, 
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Proof. We give a proof of the sequents 113x.4 tlV_ulA and ~(AA 
1 B) tll(A 3B), leaving the others as exercises. We have 
V’s 1 A. A [ y/.u] t 
v's1 A tl3xA 
~~3.uA,V.u~A C 
113sA t1v'x1/I 
where ~1 is a new variable 
A,B,A tB 
A.B EAzB 
l(AzB),A,B t 
T(AIB),A tA T(AIB),A tlB 
T(AATB).~(AIJB)), A t 
~(AATB).T(AIB),A tB 
T(AATB),T(AIB) C_AXJB 
l(Ar\lB).l(AzB) C 
l(Ar\lB) tll(A~B) L 
We are now ready to prove the main lemma about the double-negation translation. 
The correctness of many embeddings of classical logic into intuitionistic logic follows 
from this lemma, including those due to Kolmogorov, Giidel, and Gentzen. 
Lemma 13.10. Lrt 1‘ t B,. , B,, he att!,,first-order sequent contLtininy,fi)rmulae made 
oniy,fkotn IJ, A,l. utd V’. !f‘r tB1,...,B,, is procable in !??c2.A.“.1.v-.3 then its 
trunslation rt tl (1 B: A ... A 1 B,i) is procable in Yi3, A. “.l.v. In particular, $B is 
protuhle in 9,‘. A. “.--i.g,3, then Bt is proruble in !gi3s n.7.V. 
Proof. First, we prove that if r tB1, . . . . B,, is provable in 9,‘. A. “.l.‘.’ then 
ft t B:, . . . . BJ is also provable in 9‘?. A. v.--i.v~3. This is done by a simple induction 
on proofs. Next, we prove that ilTt tl(lB: A ... AT BJ) is provable in 
Cqi2, ‘.l.‘. The only obstacle to Lemma 13.5 is the use of the (V: right)-rule. However, 
we have seen in the discussion following Lemma 13.5 that the problem, is overcome 
for formulae such that 11 A k A is provable in ?JT.A-l.v. But this is the case by 
Lemma 13.7 (which itself is a direct consequence of Lemma 13.6), since we are now 
considering formulae of the form At. Since B LllB is provable in ~i=.A,l,v for 
any B, using cuts on the premises in llr ‘, we obtain a proof of 
T+ tT(TB:A ... ~iB,f) in 9i1.h,1.v. In the special case where y1= 1 and r is 
empty, we have shown that tllBt is provable in C%‘i2,n.1,V and, using Lemma 
13.7, that Bt is provable in 9’. ^.l.‘. 0 
It is trivial that the converse of Lemma 13.10 holds (since 9T.A.1.v is a subsystem 
of ‘!#,‘.^. “.1.v*3) (and using the fact that A + is classically equivalent to A). As 
a corollary of Lemma 13.10, observe that for negative formulae (defined in Lemma 
13.8), A is provable in 59:. A.1.v iff A is provable in 99:. “.l.‘. This is because for 
a negative formula A, all atoms appears negated; thus, A = A ’ is provable in %‘,I, A’ l.‘. 
We now define several translations of classical logic into intuitionistic logic. 
Definition 13.11. The function ” (due to Gentzen) is defined as follows: 
A ‘~’ =1 1 A if A is atomic, 
(1 A)” = 1 A “, 
(AAB) =(A’r\B’), 
(AxB)’ =(A IB”), 
(AvB)-=l(lA”r\lB-), 
(VsA)“=V’sA-, 
(3xA)‘=~V’s~ A”. 
The function * (due to Godel) is defined as follows: 
A*=11 A if A is atomic, 
(l/4)*=1.4*, 
(Ar\B)*=(A*/\B*), 
(A=,B)*=l(A*r\lB*), 
(AvB)*=T(TA*ATB*), 
(V’xA)*=V’xA*, 
(3xA)*=~V’x~ A*. 
The function ’ (due to Kolmogorov) is defined as follows: 
AK=11 A if A is atomic, 
(lA)K=lAK, 
(A A B)“=ll(A” A B”), 
(A VB)K=ll(AKvBh), 
Since all atoms are negated twice in A . A *, and A K, we cn use Lemma 13.6 to show 
that A -llA”, A*-llA*, and A’=TIA’ are provable in !q11.A.7.v. Then, 
using this fact and Lemma 13.9, we can show by induction on formulae that ‘4” = A *, 
A*rA”, and Ah-A are provable in Y?.~,~.~.‘. , I Consequently. for any sequent 
1‘ LB , . . . , B,,, the sequent 
r kl(lB, A . ..AlB.,) 
is provable in !q.I. A. ‘,’ lff 
I‘* tl(lB,*r\.../\lB;) 
is provable in Yi2. *,7.V iff 
r” tl(lB;A"'AlB,;) 
is provable. Furthermore, it is easily shown that A K A”, A = A*, and A E A” are 
provable classically. 
Theorem 13.12. For r/n!! scytretlt r t B, , , B,,, if r t B, , . , B,, is protuhle in 
(q‘y. A. v.-l.V.3, thrn the sryzrcrus l- tl(lB, A...ATB,), l-* El(lB:r\ ...A 
lB,T), utd r” t1(1 By A ... A lB,:) (trt’ prmdd~ in ~~i~‘A.l.~. ItI yarticulur, if A is 
proahl~ in 97, L A. “. ‘.a,3, tllrn A . A*, and A” ure prorrrhlr in C!Yi3,A.7.v. 
Proof. We simply have to observe that the translation is, in fact, the composition of 
two functions: the first one ’ is defined as in Definition 13.11, ercept that atoms remain 
unchanged, and the second function is just ‘. This translation has the property that A’ 
contains only the connectives 3, A .l, and V. Furthermore, it is easily shown that 
r tB,....,B II is provable in %Y,^.“. l.‘.’ ifT r’ kBB;,...,B,; is (because A=A’ is 
easily provable in Y,?, A,“. ‘,‘.‘):Therefore, Lemma 13.lOapplies tar’ tB;, . . ..E.‘, 
and we obtain the desired result. ii 
It is trivial that the converse of Theorem IS.12 holds. 
We shall now discuss another translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic 
due to Girard 1141. Girard has pointed out that the usual double-negation trans- 
lations have some rather undesirable properties: 
(I) They are not compatible with substitution. Indeed, the translation A[B/P]* of 
A [B/P] is not equal to A *[B*.P] in general, due to the application of double 
negations to atoms. 
(2) Negation is not involutive. For instance, A[B/P]* and A*[B*/P] are related 
through the erasing of certain double negations (passing from 1llP to lP), but 
this erasing is not harmless. 
(3) Disjunction is not associative. For example, if A v B is translated as 
i(iAr\iB), then (AvB)vC is translated as ~(~(~(~AA~B))A-IC’), and 
Av(BvC) is translated asi(iAr\i(l(lBr\lC))). 
Girard has discovered a translation which does not suffer from these defects, and 
this translation also turns out to be quite economical in the number of negation signs 
introduced [14]. The main idea is to assign a siyn or polarity (+ or -) to every 
formula. Roughly speaking, a positive literal P (where P is an atom) is a formula of 
polarity +, a negative literal 1 P is a formula of polarity -, and, to determine the 
polarity of a compound formula, we combine its polarities as if they were truth values, 
except that + corresponds to false, - corresponds to true, existential formulae are 
always positive, and universal formulae are always negative. Given a sequent r t-d, 
the idea is that right rules have to be converted to left rules, and in order to do this we 
need to move formulae in A to the left-hand side of the sequent. The new twist is that 
formulae in A will be treated differently according to their polarity. One of the key 
properties of polarities is that every formula A of polarity - turns out to be 
equivalent to a formula of the form lB, with B of polarity +. Then every formula 
A ~161 in d of polarity ~ will be transferred to the left-hand side as B (and not as 
11 B), and every formula A in d of polarity + will be transferred to the left-hand side 
as 1 A. The translation is then completely determined if we add the obvious require- 
ment that the translation of a classically provable sequent should be intuitionistically 
provable and that it should be as simple as possible. Let us consider some typical 
cases. 
CNW 1: The last inference is 
l- tlC, 1D 
l- t~CvlD 
where C and D are positive. The sequent r tl C,l D is translated as r, C, D I-, and 
we have the inference 
1-,C.D t 
It is, thus, natural to translate 1 C v 1 D as l(C A D) since then C A D will be placed 
on the left-hand side (because l(C A D) is negative). 
CUSP 2: The last inference is 
r tC,D 
r tCvD 
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where C and D are positive. The sequent r t C, D is translated as I’, 1 C, 1 D I-, and 
we have inference 
r,lC,lD t 
T,TCATD t 
This time, the simplest thing to do is to translate C v D as C v D (since Cv D is 
positive), so that l(C v D) is placed on the left-hand side of the sequent. This is indeed 
legitimate because 1 (C v D) = 1 C A 1 D is provable intuitionistically. 
Cuse 3: The last inference is 
where C is positive. The sequent r tC[~‘is] is translated as l-1 C[y/.u] t, and we 
have the inference 
f,lC[l’/“l F 
r,3.u1c t 
We translate V’sC as 13slC, so that 3xlC is placed on the left-hand side of the 
sequent. 
Cu.rc> 4: The last inference is 
where C is positive. The sequent r FI C 
have the inference 
‘[J;/.u] is translated as f, C ‘[J/.X] t, and we 
We translate V’ulC as 13sC, so that 3.uC is placed on the left-hand side of the 
sequent. 
Curse 5: The last inference is 
r t c [t/x] 
r t3xc 
where C is positive. The sequent r t C [t;.~] is translated as r, 1 C [t/x] t , and we 
have the inference 
r, 1 c [t/x] k- 
r,v’s7c t 
The simplest thing to do is to translate 3.X as 3xC, so that 13.S is placed on the 
left-hand side of the sequent. This is possible because 13xC-V.ulC is provable 
intuitionistically. 
335 
CUW 6: The last inference is 
where C is positive. The sequent r tl C [t/x] is translated as r, C [t/x] t. The 
simplest thing to do is to translate 3.~1 C as 3.~1 C, so that 13x1 C is placed on the 
left-hand side of the sequent. This is possible because 13x1 C = V.xll C is provable 
intuitionistically, and we have the sequence of inferences 
r, crti-~1 t 
r t1 c [t/s] 
r, 11 c [t/s] t 
I-, V.~llC[fi'.Y] t 
Note that it was necessary 
13slC~V\-l1C is provable 
CUSP 7: The last inference is 
I-FC rtD 
r tCr\D 
to first double-negate C[t/x]. This is because 
intuitionistically, but 13x1 C E VxC is not. 
where C, D are positive. The sequents r t C and r t-D are translated as T,lC t 
and r, 1 D t Since C A D is positive, the simplest thing to do is to translate C A D as 
C A D, so that 1 (C A D) is placed on the left-hand side of the sequent. This is possible 
because ~(11 C A 11 D) =l (C A D) is provable intuitionistically, and we have the 
sequence of inferences 
r,lCE r,lDt 
r t11c l- ~TFID 
r tllC~llD 
f,l(llC~llD) t 
Case 8: The last inference is 
r t1c rtD 
where C, D are positive. The sequents r Fl C and r ED are translated as r, C F 
and r,l D t. Since 1 CAD is positive, the simplest thing to do is to translate 
1 C A D as 1 C A D, so that ~(1 C A D) is placed on the left-hand side of the sequent. 
This is possible because ~(1 C A 11 D) =l(l C A D) is provable intuitionistically, 
and we have the sequence of inferences 
r,c F r,lDt 
r t1c l- tllD 
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C~sr 9: The last inference is 
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where C, D are positive. The sequents r tl C and f tlD are translated as r, C t 
and r, D F, and we have the inference 
r,c k r.D t 
I‘, C v D t 
We translate 1 C A 1 D as l(C v D), so that C v D is placed on the left-hand side of 
the sequent. 
Considering all the cases, we arrive at Tables 1 and 2 defining the Girard translation 
A of a formula. 
Definition 13.13. Given any formula A. its sign (polarity) and its Girard translation 
2 are given by Tables 1 and 2. 
If A =P, where P is an atom, including the constants T (true) and _L (false), then 
.x~n(A)= + and A^= A, and if A is a compound formula then 2 is given by Tables 
1 and 2. 
In order to state the main property of the Girard translation, we need one more 
definition. Given a formula A, we define its translation ,? as follows: 
A= 
7A if scjn(A)=+, 
B if .s~~n(A)=- and A-77, 
+.c +.D +.CnD +.CvD -.T(CATD) 
+.C -,JD +.CATD -.--i(lC~Dj -.J(CAD) 
-.lC +.D +.ICAD -.--i(CnlD) +.CvD 
-.lC -.lD -.--i(CvD) -.T(CAD) -.--i(lC~ D) 
Givend=B,,..., I?,,, we let d= B1, , B,. Then a sequent r t d is translated into the 
sequent r, 2 t 
We have the following theorem due to Girard [14]. 
Theorem 13.14. Given any sequent r k A, ij’ r t A is provable classically 
y’. A. V.l.if.3), then 
‘ its translation r, 2 t is provable intuitionistically 
gi=. A. “. 1, V.3). 
(in 
(in 
Proof (by induction on the structure ofproofs). We have already considered a number 
of cases in the discussion leading to Tables 1 and 2. As an auxiliary result, we need to 
show that the following formulae are provable intuitionistically (in fact, the top four 
follow from Lemmas 13.4 and 13.6, and the fact that 111 A ~1 A is provable 
intuitionistically): 
l(lcAllD)-l(lcAD), 
l(llcAlD)-l(cAlD), 
We leave the remaining cases as an exercise. 0 
Observe that a formula A of any polarity can be made into an equivalent formula of 
polarity +, namely, A + = A A T, or an equivalent formula of polarity -, namely 
A = A v 1 T. The Girard translation has some nice properties, and the following 
lemma lists some of them [14]. 
Lemma 13.15. The translation A-2 yiren in Dqfinition 13.13 is compatible with 
suhstitutiorzs respecting polarities. Furthermore, it sati$ies a number qf remarkable 
identities (in the equivalences below, it is assumed that we are considering the Girard 
translations of the.fiw~~ulae involved. For example, in (i), \re really mean lT= 2. To 
unclutter the notation, hats will he omitted): 
(i) Neyation is incolutive: 11 A = A. 
(ii) De Morgan identities: ~(AAB)-~Av~B;~(AvB)-~AA~B; AIB= 
~AvB;~~‘\-A=~~~A;~~~A-V.~~A. 
(iii) AssociatiritJ~ of A and v ; as a consequence, (A A B)=, C = A =J(B 1 C) and 
AI>(BvC)-(A1B)vC. 
(iv) Neutrality identities: A v _L = A; A A 1 I = A. 
(v) Commututirity of A and v (as a consequence, A 3 B ~1 B 21 A). 
(vi) DistrihutivitJ, identities 12.ith restriction on polarities: A A (P v Q) = 
(Ar\P)v(Ar\Q); Av(Lr\M)-(AvL)r\(AvM) (where P,Q are positive, and L,M 
neyatice). 
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward, but somewhat tedious. Because of the 
polarities, many cases have to be considered. Some cases are checked in 1141 and the 
others can be easily verified. LA 
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